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This study examines the perspectives of experienced audit committee members on 
mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) in a South African context. This follows the 
recent initiatives by the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) to make 
audit firm rotation compulsory in South Africa.  Semi-structured, in-person interviews 
were conducted with audit committee members in South Africa to explore and 
contribute to the existing literature on audit committee member positions on MAFR. 
Twenty-two audit committee members were interviewed. Key discussion areas 
revolved around the regulator’s intended impact of MAFR in South Africa, including the 
promotion of auditor independence, the lowering of audit firm market concentration 
and acceleration of the rate of transformation in the South African audit industry. The 
findings show a general consensus among the audit committee members interviewed 
that MAFR will not achieve any of the objectives of the IRBA and that the members are 
predominantly in opposition of MAFR. Furthermore, the members proposed various 
arguments against MAFR, illustrating how the policy has limited benefits, if any, and 
will introduce many monetary and non-monetary costs into the audit industry, which 
could negatively impact the appeal of the audit industry. The vast majority of members 
held the view that the primary purpose of MAFR in South Africa is not to promote 
auditor independence, but is rather intended to address market concentration and 
transformation. However, the findings indicate that MAFR is believed to not be the best 
solution for these issues and, as such, further research and alternative measures 
should be sought by the regulator.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A prevalent way of communicating financial information about an entity to those outside 
the entity is through financial reports (Johnson, Khurana, & Kenneth Reynolds, 2002). 
According to the Conceptual Framework published by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), financial reports must “faithfully represent the phenomena 
that it purports to represent” (IFRS Foundation, page A27, 2010). In order for users of 
financial reports to be able to rely on faithfully represented financial information, 
financial reports must be credible. An audit is a primary means of providing reasonable 
assurance as to whether the financial report is “presented fairly, in all material 
respects” (International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), page 73, 2012). This 
assurance is provided to external users of financial reports in the form of an auditor’s 
opinion, which is contained in the financial reports of the audited entity. In this way, the 
auditor’s opinion provides assurance to the users of financial reports regarding its 
credibility (IFAC, page 73, 2012). 
In the same way that the financial report of an entity must be credible, so too must the 
opinion of the auditor.  The ability of the audit process to provide reasonable assurance 
on the credibility of a financial report depends on the quality of the audit (Johnson et 
al., 2002). DeAngelo (page 186, 1981) defines audit quality as the “probability that a 
given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) 
report the breach.” This definition has become widely used in the auditing industry and 
suggests that auditor competence and auditor independence can be seen as key 
factors affecting audit quality (Kwon, Lim, & Simnett, 2014). As such, audit quality is 
improved if the auditor detects and subsequently corrects or reports a material 
misstatement (Johnson et al., 2002).  
In a recent study, Tepalagul and Lin (2015) explicitly identify four main threats to 
auditor independence. These threats include client importance, non-audit services, 
auditor tenure and client affiliation with the firms. According to Tepalagul and Lin (2015) 
if auditors are not independent, they will be less likely to report irregularities, thus 
impairing audit quality.  
The threat of long audit tenure is one that has particularly concerned regulators with 
regard to auditor independence. The length of auditor tenure is viewed as a threat to 
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independence due to the close relationship and familiarity that may develop between 
the auditor and the client as the auditor spends more time with the client (IRBA, 2009; 
Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). This familiarity increases the likelihood of the auditor acting in 
favour of management, which in turn would reduce auditor independence and audit 
quality (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Dopuch, King, & Schwartz, 2001; Geiger & 
Raghunandan, 2002; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).  
Various measures have been implemented by regulators to address the threat of long 
audit tenure. The IFAC Code of Professional Conduct (2006), for example, 
recommends rotation of the individual audit partner so that the client does not have the 
same audit partner for an extended period of time. Section 92(1) of the Companies Act 
(Act No. 71 of 2008) states that the designated auditor may not serve as the auditor of 
an entity for more than 5 consecutive years. Furthermore, audit committees play an 
important role in corporate governance and the monitoring of auditor independence 
(Dobija, 2013). The mandate of the audit committee involves overseeing financial 
reporting and its related disclosures, selecting an independent auditor and continually 
evaluating the auditors independence (Companies Act No. 71 of 2008; Fontaine, 
Khemakhem, & Herda, 2015; King IV Report, 2016). As such, the audit committee may 
voluntarily choose to rotate an auditor if it feels that the auditor is not sufficiently 
competent or independent. However, some regulators have sought to further promote 
auditor independence by prescribing more defined audit committee duties, audit 
committee accountability and extending the rotation requirement beyond the audit 
partner to the audit firm (Fiolleau, Hoang, Jamal, & Sunder, 2013). The solution 
whereby the audit firm is required to rotate off a client after a prescribed period of time 
is known as Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR).  
A notable example of further regulation is that of the European Union. In 2014, the 
European Union issued a directive introducing a policy of MAFR (IRBA, 2016). The 
policy requires mandatory rotation of the audit firm every 10 years, unless the audit 
undergoes a tendering process in which case the rotation period can be extended to 
20 years (The Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2014). However, 
the regulations surrounding MAFR in the European Union are complex and many 
believe that the motivation behind the audit reform process is politically driven 
(Chourdhury, 2017). Before this directive was issued, a few member states had 
considered MAFR in their own capacity but ultimately decided against its 
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implementation. France and the United Kingdom, for example, considered MAFR but 
concluded that it would decrease audit quality and increase audit costs (Nombembe, 
2017).  
There are approximately 41 countries where MAFR has been implemented and 
continues to be implemented (Nombembe, 2017). Each country has varying maximum 
audit tenure lengths and the MAFR requirement applies to different types of companies 
and industries to varying degrees. Italy is an example of a country where there is a 
statutory requirement for audit firms to rotate (Kwon et al., 2014). The policy was 
introduced in 1975, requiring a nine-year rotation period (Kwon et al., 2014; 
Nombembe, 2017). Other examples of countries with MAFR for some entities include 
China, India, Morocco, the Netherlands and Russia (Nombembe, 2017).     
Other countries have implemented MAFR previously and subsequently revoked the 
policy. After introducing MAFR in 2002, the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
announced its intention to discontinue this policy in 2016 (Chourdhury, 2016; 
Nombembe, 2017). The reason given was that research did not provide conclusive 
evidence that MAFR is associated with improved audit quality and that there were 
negative consequences associated with frequent auditor rotation (Chourdhury, 2016). 
Argentina repealed MAFR in its entirety in 2016 as the country was more in favour of 
partner rotation (Nombembe, 2017). South Korea adopted MAFR in 2003 and it 
became effective in 2006 but was subsequently repealed for public companies in 2009, 
the reason being that MAFR “[did] not improve audit quality” (Nombembe, page 14, 
2017). Canada also implemented and discontinued MAFR due to a lack of cost-
effectiveness and the preference of partner rotation (Chourdhury, 2016; Nombembe, 
2017). Before the recent directive issued by the Council of the European Union, Spain 
and Austria also implemented MAFR for certain types of entities but repealed the policy 
due to a reduction in audit quality and a disruption in the audit market structure 
(Nombembe, 2017).  
On the other hand, there are countries who have considered the implementation of 
MAFR but chosen not to implement it. MAFR has been proposed in the United States 
a few times, however, due to switching costs and a diminished ability for the audit firm 
to gain a deep understanding of the audit client, both auditors and audit clients have 
opposed its implementation (Dopuch et al., 2001). Japan also considered MAFR but 
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decided against it as MAFR would decrease audit quality, increase audit costs and 
lead to a decrease in the auditor’s knowledge of the client. Furthermore, it was not 
required by other major countries at that time (Nombembe, 2017).  
In terms of the South African context, currently only mandatory audit partner rotation 
is in implementation. In terms of the Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 2008), the individual 
partner is required to rotate every five years. Furthermore, the duties of audit 
committees have been legislated in terms of Section 94 of this Act and 
recommendations are provided within the King Code on Corporate Governance (King 
IV Report, 2016) on how the audit committee should promote the independence of the 
external auditor. The Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors in South Africa 
(IRBA), however, stated that it did not believe the current measures in place to be 
sufficient in promoting auditor independence (IRBA, 2016).  
On the 2 June 2017, the IRBA issued a statement that it had gazetted MAFR “to 
enhance auditor independence and protect public interest” (IRBA, page 1, 2017b). The 
Rule prescribes that the auditor, including a network firm1, of a South African public 
interest entity shall not serve as the incumbent auditor for more than 10 consecutive 
years, following which the auditor is required to rotate (IRBA, 2017c). The IRBA Code 
of Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors (2009) defines a public interest entity 
as a listed entity or an entity that is defined as such by regulation or where an audit is 
required by regulation. Only after the expiration of 5 years will the auditor be eligible 
for reappointment2 (IRBA, 2017c). The Rule will be effective for financial years 
                                            
1 The IRBA defines a network firm as a firm belonging to a network, where a network is defined as “a 
larger structure: 
(a) That is aimed at co-operation; and  
(b) That is clearly aimed at profit or cost sharing or shares common ownership, control or management, 
common quality control policies and procedures, common business strategy, the use of a common 
brand-name, or a significant part of professional resources.” (IRBA, 2009)  
2 A transitional provision, that will only apply at the effective date, states that “If, at the effective date, 
the public interest entity has appointed joint auditors and both have had audit tenure of 10 years or 
more, then only one audit firm is required to rotate at the effective date and the remaining audit firm will 




beginning on or after the 1 April 2023 (IRBA, 2017c). According to Bernard Agulhas, 
CEO of the IRBA, the issuing of this Rule is aligned to the global developments and 
concerns of international regulators regarding auditor independence (IRBA, 2017b).  
In terms of the responses of interested and affected parties to the IRBA’s consultation 
letter, the perspectives of various audit committee members were documented. The 
perspectives of audit committee members are important to consider when 
implementing a policy such as MAFR given the role that they play in promoting auditor 
independence (Fontaine et al., 2015). Only one other study by Fontaine, Khemakhem 
and Herda (2015) has explored the perspectives of audit committee members. This 
study was performed in a Canadian context. The responses to the IRBA’s consultation 
paper, some of which were submitted by audit committee members, and the results of 
the study performed by Fontaine et al (2015) indicate that audit committees members 
in general are not in favour of MAFR.  
The purpose of this study is to explore the perspectives of South African audit 
committee members on MAFR. This research contributes to the literature by providing 
insight into the opinions and thought processes of audit committee members. Given 
that one of the most important roles of the audit committee is to nominate an 
independent external auditor and to evaluate the auditor’s independence at least 
annually, audit committee members develop a sense of what independence entails. 
Therefore, audit committee members could provide useful insights on how a rule, such 
as MAFR, would impact the committee’s ability to exercise professional judgment and, 
consequently, external auditor independence and audit quality.  
This paper also contributes to South African specific research in that the considerations 
surrounding MAFR do not solely revolve around auditor independence. Although the 
IRBA (2016) have stated that the promotion of auditor independence is the primary 
objective of MAFR, market concentration and transformation considerations are key 
areas of focus in the professional debate. The IRBA (2016) believes that MAFR could 
provide non-Big Four firms with the opportunity to participate more meaningfully in 
audit tenders, thus helping to lower the level of concentration in the audit firm market. 
A description of the Big Four firms is provided in Chapter Three under Population and 
Participant Selection. Furthermore, South Africa has a history of racial segregation and 
the transformation of the audit industry is considered to be too slow (IRBA, 2016). The 
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IRBA (2016) holds the view that MAFR could provide more opportunities for audit firms 
owned or managed by previously disadvantaged race groups to tender for larger 
clients, thus contributing more to socio-economic racial transformation (IRBA, 2016).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter Two reviews the relevant 
literature on MAFR, in which prominent themes are developed that motivate the 
research questions. The research methodology is set out in Chapter Three, which is 
followed by a presentation and analysis of the results in Chapter Four. Finally, Chapter 
Five concludes with an overview of the key research findings and discusses limitations 
and areas for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The next section is set out as follows. Firstly, data considerations from previous studies 
on MAFR will be discussed, followed by a review of the proponents and opponents of 
MAFR. The role of the audit committee and its relevance in promoting auditor 
independence will then be reviewed. The literature review will conclude with a 
discussion of MAFR in the South African context, focusing on the professional debate 
between the IRBA and professionals and their conflicting views regarding MAFR.   
PREVIOUS DATA CONSIDERATIONS 
Literature proposes arguments both for and against MAFR. In terms of the threat of 
audit tenure length, various arguments have been put forward highlighting the 
proposed benefits of MAFR, as it effectively curtails the audit tenure. However, there 
are instances where audit firm rotation has been enforced in a mandatory environment, 
as opposed to a voluntary one, making the policy and its associated benefits and costs 
difficult to research (Cameran, Francis, Marra & Pettinicchio, 2013; Hay, 2015).  
Most studies on audit firm rotation have been conducted using data from environments 
in which audit firm rotation is voluntary (Lennox, Wu, & Zhang, 2014). The issue therein 
is that voluntary events are endogenous and, therefore, any extension of such findings 
to environments where rotation is mandatory could be problematic (Kwon et al., 2014; 
Lennox et al., 2014). For example, a client may wish to dismiss their audit firm and 
change to a lower quality firm when the audit firm identifies material misstatements, 
rather than running the risk of the auditor issuing a modified audit opinion (Kwon et al., 
2014). With a lower quality firm, the likelihood of the new firm identifying the 
misstatement is lower and if the firm does identify a problem, management may be 
more able to convince the auditor to not report the misstatement (DeAngelo, 1981a; 
Kwon et al., 2014). This implies that clients without reliable financial reporting functions 
or unethical management may tend to rotate auditors more often. This could result in 
self-selection bias in that clients with longer audit tenure may have more reliable 
financial reporting functions or ethical management than those with shorter audit 
tenures (Kwon et al., 2014). Therefore, in a voluntary environment, it is difficult to 
distinguish whether the decrease in audit quality at the time of auditor rotation is due 
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to the lack of the auditor’s client-specific knowledge, or due to the already unreliable 
financial reporting environment of the client (Lennox et al., 2014).  
Carey, Geiger and Connell (2008) also found that a voluntary change is more likely 
following the issue of a modified audit report and, therefore, characteristics of auditor-
client relationships following a voluntary rotation are not necessarily the same as those 
following a mandatory rotation (Casterella & Johnston, 2013). Ultimately, conclusions 
about the effectiveness of MAFR appear to depend on whether the data obtained was 
from mandatory or voluntary rotation environments (Casterella & Johnston, 2013). This 
distinction should therefore be considered when reading the following sections on 
previous literature on the effectiveness of audit firm rotation.  
PROPONENTS OF MAFR 
Despite the differences in data type, a common argument in favour of MAFR is that 
the policy limits the number of years that an auditor can spend on an engagement with 
a specific client (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Dopuch et al., 2001; Geiger & 
Raghunandan, 2002; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). Consequently, the potential for the 
auditor to become too familiar with the client is limited and the threat of audit tenure is 
mitigated (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Dopuch et al., 2001; Geiger & Raghunandan, 
2002; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). Proponents of MAFR argue that shorter audit tenure 
periods will enhance auditor independence and, in turn, improve audit quality 
(Casterella & Johnston, 2013).  Additionally, it is argued that long tenure may result in 
a sense of complacency for the auditor, meaning that the auditor is not as rigorous in 
performing audit work in order to provide reasonable assurance over the financial 
reports (DeAngelo, 1981b).  
Dopuch et al (2001) conducted an experiment in which the willingness of an auditor to 
issue a biased report in favour of management was assessed. (A biased report in 
favour of management refers to an audit report that is not in line with audit evidence 
obtained but management has persuaded the auditor to issue a different, more 
favourable report, such as an unqualified report.) The experiment was conducted in a 
mandatory audit firm rotation environment and an environment with no audit firm 
rotation requirements. It was found that, in environments of mandatory rotation, the 
willingness of auditors to issue biased reports was reduced relative to environments 
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with no rotation requirements. Mandatory rotation meant that the auditor had less time 
to develop a close relationship with the client and was more likely to exercise objective 
professional judgement and detect and report on material misstatements (Geiger & 
Raghunandan, 2002).  
Daniels and Booker (2011) also performed an experiment involving different audit firm 
rotation environments, however, the experiment focused on financial statement user 
perceptions on audit quality and audit independence. Daniels and Booker (2011) found 
a positive relationship between MAFR scenarios and clients’ perceptions of auditor 
independence but no change in audit quality perceptions. This implies that, although 
actual audit quality may increase with MAFR, this is not perceived by the users of 
financial statements.  
Kwon et al (2014) note that the professional skepticism of the auditor is likely to 
increase on audit partner rotation due to the new audit partner having a fresh view on 
the audit, which enhances auditor independence. However, Kwon et al (2014) explain 
that partner rotation is considerably different to firm rotation for various reasons. As a 
result, the effect of increased professional skepticism would be less so than with audit 
firm rotation, due to the potential knowledge transfer and the sharing of information 
between staff within the audit firm (Kwon et al., 2014).  
In a paper exploring MAFR in an Italian setting, Cameran, Principe and Trombetta 
(2016) tested how audit quality changes throughout the tenure of the audit by looking 
at the level of abnormal working capital accruals throughout the tenure. In Italy, the 
rotation rules are such that an auditor can be reappointed for two consecutive three 
year periods and must rotate after the third three year period (M. Cameran et al., 2016). 
Cameran et al (2016) find that audit quality improves in the period prior to rotation as 
abnormal working capital accruals are more conservative in this period. This could 
possibly be attributed to the notion that the auditor no longer has a financial incentive 
to retain the client and the firm that will soon takeover might discover negligence of the 
current auditor (M. Cameran et al.,2016). This implies that MAFR leads to an 
improvement in audit quality just prior to rotation.  
Another benefit of MAFR is that it could potentially address the threat to auditor 
independence as identified by Zhang (1999). This threat to independence includes 
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conflicts of interest between the auditor and client with respect to financial reporting 
values, which could result in management pressuring the auditor to accept their values 
(Zhang, 1999). A possible solution to this could be MAFR, as MAFR would limit the 
auditor’s stake in future engagements. As a result, penalties, such as dismissal, 
imposed by management if the auditor does not act in their favour, would have less of 
an impact on the auditor’s tendency to accept inappropriate reporting values (Zhang, 
1999).   
Other benefits of MAFR, as identified in a study conducted by Harris and Whisenant 
(2012), include less earnings management, less earnings smoothing and more timely 
recognition of losses, all of which improve audit and financial reporting quality. The 
results of the study by Harris and Whisenant (2012) indicate that environments which 
have adopted MAFR tend to have a higher level of audit quality, measured as “the 
amount of unexpected opportunistic discretion in earnings before and after the 
adoption of MAR rules”, compared to those that have not adopted MAFR. However, 
Harris and Whisenant (2012) also find that audit quality decreased in both the years 
before and after the rotation of the auditor, implying that there is a risk of impaired audit 
quality around the rotation period which regulators need to consider.  
OPPONENTS OF MAFR  
A number of academics and practitioners oppose the implementation of MAFR (Mara 
Cameran et al., 2013; Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Jackson, Moldrich, & Roebuck, 
2008; Johnson et al., 2002; Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-Aguilar, & Carrera, 2009). The 
General Accounting Office in the United States of America performed interviews and 
surveys on accounting firms, chief fiscal officers and audit committee chairs of Fortune 
1000 companies regarding the potential effects of MAFR (Daniels & Booker, 2011). 
The majority of the participants were in agreement that the potential costs of 
implementing MAFR would exceed the proposed benefits (Daniels & Booker, 2011).  
The main argument against MAFR is that it would result in a lack of client-specific 
knowledge, which is necessary for the auditor to deliver a high-quality audit (Casterella 
& Johnston, 2013; Kwon et al., 2014). Over time, the auditor gains client-specific 
knowledge relating to the client’s accounting systems, internal controls, operations and 
control structure (Kwon et al., 2014). This knowledge is key in enabling auditors to 
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detect material misstatements or omissions, without which the auditor may rely 
increasingly on management’s representations (Johnson et al., 2002; Kwon et al., 
2014). As MAFR would require more frequent rotation of auditors and shorter audit 
tenure, auditors would have less time to obtain this understanding and knowledge, 
thereby impairing audit quality (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Johnson et al., 2002; 
Kwon et al., 2014).  
The findings of Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) are consistent with the notion that 
shorter audit tenures result in decreased audit quality (Johnson et al., 2002). Geiger 
and Raghunandan (2002) found that auditors with clients on the verge of bankruptcy 
were less likely to modify their audit opinions in the first few years of the engagement.  
Obtaining this client-specific knowledge and understanding is costly and time-
consuming, as the incoming firm needs to spend time building its knowledge of the 
client in order to perform an effective audit, resulting in higher audit hours and audit 
costs (Kwon et al., 2014; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2011). Thus, 
rotating audit firms results in significant start-up costs for the incoming auditors 
(DeAngelo, 1981b). Additionally, the client may lose out on the benefits associated 
with an auditor who is an industry specialist because MAFR would force the client to 
‘rotate-off’ an auditor, even when the client believes that the auditor is the most 
appropriate for the client’s business (Kwon et al., 2014). Furthermore, in terms of 
financial statements user’s perceptions of auditor independence, Tepalagul and Lin, 
(2015) found that users generally do not perceive auditor independence to be impaired 
by long audit tenure, implying little benefit to implementing MAFR (Jackson et al., 
2008). 
ISA 200 (IFAC, page 76, 2009) defines audit risk as a “function of the risks of material 
misstatement and detection risk”. Detection risk refers to the risk that the procedures 
performed by the auditor will not detect material misstatements that could exist (IFAC, 
2009). As shorter audit tenures are associated with a decreased ability of the auditor 
to detect material misstatements or omissions (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002), 
detection risk is higher in the initial years of the engagement, meaning that audit risk 
is higher. Therefore, as shorter audit tenures are one of the consequences of MAFR 
and there is high audit risk in the initial stages of the audit engagement, implementation 
of MAFR could lead to a decline in audit quality. 
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Studies have also been performed that find no impact of MAFR on audit quality (Kwon 
et al., 2014; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2009). Ruiz-Barbadillo et al (2009) studied the effect 
of MAFR on audit quality in Spain, where MAFR was enforced between 1988 and 
1995. This study focused on financially distressed clients and the likelihood of the 
auditor issuing a going-concern audit report between 1991 and 2000. Hence, data from 
when MAFR was in place and from the period after MAFR was repealed was included 
(Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2009). The results showed no change in the likelihood of audit 
firms issuing a going-concern audit report between the period during and post the 
implementation of MAFR, which according to Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009) suggests 
that MAFR has no impact on audit quality. However, Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009) 
experienced limitations in their study in that the MAFR policy in Spain was never truly 
enforced. The rotation period was nine years and the policy ended after 7 years, 
meaning it is unclear as to how MAFR truly affects audit quality (Lennox et al., 2014).  
Kwon et al (2014) also studied the effects of MAFR on audit quality in Korea between 
2000 and 2009. This period included the years between 2006 and 2009 when MAFR 
was in place. In comparing mandatory rotations to voluntary rotations both before 2006 
and during the implementation period, the results showed no significant change in audit 
quality (Kwon et al., 2014).  
Another argument against MAFR is that it could potentially reduce audit fees as a result 
of the tendering process, which could be detrimental to the audit profession in terms 
of attracting and retaining talent (Bourne, 2017; Shango, 2017). In order to win over a 
new client, firms may offer a discount on the initial fee as a tactic for competing with 
the competition (Kwon et al., 2014). According to Bourne (2017), this is already a 
challenge in the audit industry and MAFR will increase the level of technical complexity 
in an already complex environment, which could see a decline in audit quality over 
time. Studies performed by Cameran et al. (2013) and Kwon et al. (2014) find evidence 
to the contrary. Cameran et al. (2013) studied the effects of MAFR in Italy, where 
MAFR has been in place since 1975 and found that, although audit fees in the initial 
year of the engagement were discounted, subsequent fees were higher and exceeded 
the initial fee discount. Kwon et al. (2014) also found that audit fees increased 
significantly once MAFR was introduced in Korea.   
For almost 40 years, various parties have debated as to whether the rotation of the 
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audit firm should be mandatory or voluntary (Kwon et al., 2014). The views and results 
of research performed have been mixed and the lack of situations in which true 
mandatory audit firm rotation is or was required has meant that many conclusions have 
been based on data from environments with voluntary audit firm rotation (Casterella & 
Johnston, 2013). Consequently, Casterella and Johnston (2013) advise regulators to 
recognize the difference between the two environments before making generalizations 
of the findings from voluntary rotation environments (Kwon et al., 2014). Ultimately, the 
proposed benefits and costs of MAFR can be identified as a theme in the literature 
relating to MAFR. The findings from this section inform the first theme in this study: 
Theme identified: Benefits and costs of MAFR and the related 
impact on audit quality.  
This theme, and those to follow, will be used to inform the research questions of this 
study, which are explored further in Chapter Three.  
THE ROLE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE  
There are many contrasting views on whether MAFR enhances auditor independence, 
and thus audit quality. Apart from policies of mandatory audit partner rotation and 
MAFR, the role of the audit committee is centered around ensuring the independence 
of the external auditor (King IV Report, 2016). Harber and Willows (2016) performed a 
study in which 14 audit partners from audit firms of various sizes were interviewed 
regarding their views of MAFR. Some of the partners interviewed agreed that the best 
way to improve auditor independence would be to enhance and develop the duties of 
the audit committee, therefore improving the corporate governance within the entity 
(Harber & Willows, 2016). This view indicates that regulators should perhaps consider 
the role of the audit committee in enhancing auditor independence before 
implementing MAFR.   
According to IRBA, “maximum audit quality is achieved in an environment where the 
audit committee is clear about its responsibilities and is enabled to work independently 
from the management of the company” (IRBA, page 7, 2016). Regulators have 
implemented regulations and structures whereby responsibility is delegated to the 
audit committee to enhance auditor independence (Fiolleau et al., 2013).  
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Section 94 of the Companies Act (Act No.71 of 2008) deals with legislation that applies 
to audit committees. In terms of s94(4), all audit committee members must be 
independent from the company. Section 94(7) prescribes various audit committee 
duties, including the nomination of an independent auditor and the preparation of a 
report to be included in the Annual Financial Statements. The report prepared by the 
audit committee details whether the audit committee is satisfied that the auditor was 
independent of the client throughout the financial year. For this reason, there is a view 
that the audit committee “owns the appointment process and has the primary 
responsibility of gathering relevant information and making the appointment decision” 
(Fiolleau et al., page 865, 2013).  
Furthermore, s94(7)(d) requires the audit committee to determine the nature and 
extent of non-audit services, which was one of the four threats to independence as 
identified by Tepalagul and Lin (2015). As such, the audit committee has the ability to 
limit the provision of non-audit services that could compromise independence. Ghafran 
and O’Sullivan (2013) found evidence that the actions of independent audit committees 
result in less non-audit services being performed by the auditor, therefore improving 
auditor independence. Additionally, the more independent and larger the audit 
committees, the higher the level of assurance quality (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013). 
In addition to the legislation contained in the Companies Act, the King IV Report (2016), 
referred to from hereon as King IV, also gives recommendations as to the composition 
and duties of the audit committee. Although King IV is not legislation, it is a JSE listing 
requirement for all South African listed companies to comply with the Code, therefore 
making compliance with King IV compulsory for all listed companies (Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, 2017a).  
Paragraph 55 of King IV recommends that “the members of the audit committee 
should, as a whole, have the necessary financial literacy, skills and experience to 
execute their duties effectively” (King IV Report, page 56, 2016). If the audit committee 
exercised their duties effectively, it would perform sufficient work so as to nominate an 
independent auditor for the company. Additionally, the committee would be able to 
effectively assess the independence of the auditor for each financial year in order to 
produce the report required by s94(7)(f) of the Companies Act. The findings of Ghafran 
and O’Sullivan (2013) were consistent with the notion that audit committees consisting 
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of members with greater accounting or financial expertise were associated with a 
higher level of audit quality and independence.  
Paragraph 59(a) of King IV also recommends that the audit committee prepare a 
statement regarding whether the audit committee is satisfied with the independence of 
the external auditor. This statement should address specific considerations, such as 
the steps and controls in place to determine the nature and extent of non-audit 
services, the tenure of the external audit firm and the rotation of the external audit 
partner (King IV Report, page 56, 2016). These recommendations complement the 
requirements of s97(7) of the Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 2008) and form part of the 
measures in place to promote auditor independence.  
Opponents of MAFR believe that MAFR would diminish the duties of audit committees 
as required by the Companies Act and King IV (Harber, 2016). In a study performed 
by Harber (2016), a number of the audit partners interviewed believed that MAFR 
would diminish the audit committee’s duties in terms of the Companies Act and remove 
the need for important deliberation and decision-making by the committee. 
Additionally, many audit partners felt that the forced rotation associated with MAFR 
would limit the audit committee’s ability to nominate and retain the auditor that most 
suits the company’s need (Harber, 2016). This opinion is consistent with that of Kwon 
et al. (2014) who note that MAFR would hinder the client’s ability to retain an auditor 
that the client believes is best suited to its business.  
As mentioned previously, there was consensus among all audit partners interviewed  
by Harber (2016) that the best way to promote auditor independence is through 
development of the audit committee. This notion is consistent with the findings of 
Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) that audit and corporate failures, such as Enron and 
Arthur Andersen, occurred within companies that appeared to have a weak 
governance structure. An improvement in the composition of the audit committee, for 
example, through audit committee member education and the promotion of King IV, 
was mentioned as a way to develop the audit committee and improve independence 
(Harber, 2016). Ineffective audit committees result in a higher threat to independence, 
because those committees are less likely to carry out their duties effectively in terms 
of the Companies Act and King IV. Ultimately, there was a general consensus between 
the audit partners that measures involving the improvement of the client’s governance 
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would be more effective in promoting auditor independence than MAFR (Harber, 
2016). The findings from this section inform the second theme of this study: 
Theme identified: The role of the audit committee in ensuring auditor 
independence. This theme also recurs in later sections of this literature 
review. 
MAFR IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT  
Given the recent global developments in MAFR, particularly the developments in the 
European Union, the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) stated that it 
needed to respond accordingly in order to promote auditor independence (IRBA, 
2016). In June 2017, the IRBA issued a rule prescribing MAFR for all public interest 
entities with a rotation period of ten years.  
The key process leading up to the ruling begun in 2013, when the World Bank issued 
its second Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) – Accounting 
and Auditing (A&A) for South Africa (IRBA, 2017b). In response to the report’s 
recommendations, the IRBA revised its strategic focus to comprise Four Strategic 
Pillars, one of which includes the strengthening of the independence of the IRBA and 
of registered auditors (IRBA, 2017a). A research project was subsequently undertaken 
by the IRBA in April 2015 to achieve this strategic focus, in which mandatory audit 
tendering, joint audits and MAFR were considered. Of these three alternatives, MAFR 
was determined to be the most appropriate (IRBA, 2017a). Following this research 
period, the IRBA entered into a period of consultation with interested and affected 
parties. This began in October 2016, when the IRBA issued a Consultation Paper 
detailing its proposal of MAFR. Interested and affected parties were asked to submit 
their written comments on the Consultation Paper, to the IRBA by 20 January 2017.  
In the Consultation Paper, the IRBA addresses the theme of the current status of 
auditor independence, as well as other issues it believes to be prevalent in the auditing 
industry. The IRBA holds the view that the current measures in place to promote 
auditor independence in South Africa are not sufficient (IRBA, 2016, 2017a). An 
example of such a measure includes section 92 of the Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 
2008), which requires mandatory audit partner rotation every 5 years. According to the 
IRBA (2016, 2017), audit partners tend to not report on other audit partners from the 
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same firm where the partner’s audit work was of a poor quality, implying a possible 
threat to independence.  
Theme identified: The current status of auditor independence in 
South Africa. Given that the policy of MAFR intends to solve the issue of 
auditor independence, a lack of auditor independence should therefore be 
perceived as a problem if the implementation of MAFR is to be deemed 
necessary. Therefore, the status of auditor independence is a theme that 
underpins the implementation of MAFR and informs the motions of the 
IRBA in South Africa.  
Another issue is that of market concentration of the audit firms. Research performed 
by the IRBA (2016) shows that roughly 95% of the world’s major companies are being 
audited by one of the Big Four audit firms. Locally, the trend is similar with more than 
90% of the market capitalization of companies listed on the JSE being audited by Big 
Four firms (IRBA, 2017a). This situation implies that a failure in any one of those firms 
could have detrimental effects, such as disrupting the financial markets and 
diminishing investor confidence. An example of such an effect was experienced in 
South Africa in 2017 when the independence of KPMG, one of the Big Four audit firms, 
was allegedly compromised. Further details of this incident are presented towards the 
end of this subsection. The IRBA believes that MAFR would increase the level of 
competition by allowing other smaller firms to tender for the audit when a Big Four firm 
is ‘rotated-off’ the client.   
The concentrated nature of the auditing environment may have also had implications 
for the transformation of the audit industry in South Africa. The IRBA (2016, 2017) 
raised transformation of the audit industry as a concern, stating that it believed the 
transformation process to be too slow. The IRBA revealed the results of its research in 
a document addressing ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ in June 2017. The IRBA found 
that 72% of the audit reports of actively trading companies listed on the JSE, as at 31 
December 2015, were signed off by white registered auditors (IRBA, 2017a). 
Furthermore, the IRBA found that, of the remaining 12% of companies that were 
actively trading, 3% were signed off by black South Africans. Ultimately, the IRBA has 
implied that it finds this level of transformation concerning. Although the IRBA has 
stated that auditor independence is the primary issue that MAFR is intended to 
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address, it believes that MAFR would help smaller firms to compete for new clients 
when larger firms are ‘rotated-off’ their clients. The IRBA did, however, note that the 
effect of MAFR in increasing access to auditing opportunities might not prevail 
immediately but could be advanced over a longer period of time (IRBA, 2017a).  
The IRBA has also considered the perceived negative effects of MAFR. One such 
effect includes the loss of client knowledge and expertise on rotation (IRBA, 2017a). 
However, the IRBA does not believe this to be a problem because different clients 
across the same industry will have similar characteristics and the knowledge acquired 
by the audit firm from  previous clients may be useful when working with future clients 
(IRBA, 2017a). Furthermore, prior to accepting the audit, auditing standards require 
that the audit firm must consider whether they have the competencies, resources and 
capacity to accept the audit (IRBA, 2017a). In this way, the auditor should consider if 
there are situations in which specific expertise or experience are required. Based on 
this consideration, the auditor should then accept, continue or decline the engagement 
in terms of the auditing standards (IRBA, 2017a). The IRBA also adds that there are 
no differences between the skills and competences of all auditors registered with the 
IRBA, further implying that more than one auditor is capable of performing the same 
audit work (IRBA, 2017a). 
The issue of whether or not MAFR would negate the audit committee’s role as the 
“auditor gatekeeper,” which relates to Theme 2 of this study, is also raised (IRBA, 
2016, 2017a). In terms of King IV (King IV Report, 2016), the audit committee has the 
duty to nominate external auditors and to annually assess their independence. The 
IRBA’s belief is that the audit committee will still fulfil the role of nominating the audit 
firm for appointment by the shareholders. The shareholders ultimately approve and 
adopt the recommendations of the audit committee and, therefore, need to become 
more knowledgeable on issues surrounding auditor independence (IRBA, 2016).  
An analysis of the responses to the IRBA’s Consultation Paper (issued in October 
2016,) indicates that the general view was that MAFR would not address the issues 
raised by the IRBA. A primary concern raised by respondents was that more research 
needed to be performed by the IRBA in order to support its view that MAFR is the 
appropriate course of action in a South African context (Bourne, 2017; Hoole, 2017; 
Ramon, 2016). A discussion of some of these responses follows: 
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• Many respondents, including the IFAC, the CFO forum, SAICA and the Big Four 
Audit Firms, believed that the notion that MAFR will improve audit quality is not 
supported by international research. Chourdhury (2017) pointed out that 
evidence from research to date does not clearly demonstrate that MAFR 
improves audit quality and that further research is needed. Some respondents 
also raised the point that South Africa has strong auditing and accounting 
standards, as is evidenced by the country being ranked first in the world for 
seven consecutive years in that regard by the World Economic Forum (Hoole, 
2017, Shango, 2017). Therefore, the IRBA should consider whether MAFR 
would improve audit quality in the context of South Africa’s strong corporate 
governance environment.  
• All four of the Big Four firms responded that they were not in favour of MAFR 
and detailed various issues that they perceived relating to MAFR and its inability 
to achieve the objectives set out by the IRBA, regarding audit quality and 
independence. There was a consensus that MAFR would have a negative 
impact on the auditing industry. The frequent tendering process, as a result of 
MAFR, has the potential to reduce audit fees which could have a detrimental 
impact on attracting and retaining talent within the audit profession (Bourne, 
2017; Shango, 2017). Another disadvantage of MAFR includes all the costs 
related to the tender of the audit, which results in additional costs incurred by 
audit firms when competing for  clients and additional time investment required 
from audit committees, boards and the client’s management (Bourne, 2017; 
Hoole, 2017).  
• Loss of client knowledge was also raised as a concern by the firms. According 
to Bourne (page 7, 2017) “auditors of insurance companies and banks will attest 
to the fact that it takes at least 3 years or more to obtain an adequate knowledge 
of the client and industry,” thus implying that the quality of the audit in the later 
years of the engagement tends to be higher than in the initial years.  
• Respondents to the IRBA’s Consultation Paper also addressed the issue of 
transformation, noting that they had all made a conscious effort towards 
promoting transformation and felt that the IRBA had discounted these efforts. 
For example, as per Ernst and Young’s response to the IRBA’s consultation 
letter, 36.4% of their partners are black, 54.16% of their staff are black and 66% 
of the Executive Committee, including the CEO, is black (Bourne, 2017). 
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Consequently, Ernst and Young have a Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment3 (B-BBEE) contribution level one, which is the highest level of 
compliance with the B-BBEE codes (BEE Scorecard (Pty) Ltd., 2017; Bourne, 
2017). 
• Finally, respondents agreed that there are better alternative measures to MAFR 
for promoting auditor independence and that the IRBA should consider these 
measures before pursuing MAFR. Other measures include, for example, further 
development and enforcement of the Code of Professional Conduct, stronger 
audit committee oversight of external auditors and the improvement of the role 
and function of audit committees, such that the committee can better fulfil its 
duties in terms of the Companies Act (Bourne, 2017).  
Ultimately, together with academic literature, the professional debate elaborates on the 
common themes of the benefits and costs of MAFR. Audit fee related issues, lowballing 
(a practice whereby a lower fee is charged initially in order to compete with other firms 
so as to win the audit tender) and transformation and market concentration issues can 
be identified as individually prominent themes. Therefore, the motives of the IRBA, 
together with the responses to the Consultation Paper, inform the following themes in 
this study:  
                                            
3 ‘Broad-based black economic empowerment’ means the viable economic empowerment of all black 
people [including], in particular women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural 
areas, through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies that include, but are not limited to—  
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive 
assets; 
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, 
workers, co-operatives and other collective enterprises; 
(c) human resource and skills development;  
(d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; 
(e) preferential procurement from enterprises that are owned or managed by black people; and 
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people;’ (Act No.46 of 2013: Broad-




Theme identified: Market concentration and transformation 
considerations for MAFR in South Africa. This is a unique theme 
surrounding MAFR in South Africa and is considered to be one of the 
primary objectives of the IRBA in implementing MAFR within South Africa.  
Theme identified: Audit fee related issues, including lowballing, and 
their impact on audit quality.  
After having considered the responses, the IRBA gazetted MAFR in June 2017. Within 
weeks of the ruling, the independence of one of the Big Four audit firms came under 
public scrutiny. This was echoed by a drop in South Africa’s World Economic Forum 
ranking for auditing and reporting standards from first place to thirtieth place (World 
Economic Forum, 2017). It is alleged that KPMG acted negligently and unethically in 
failing to identify and/or report on accounting irregularities relating to work performed 
in 2014-2015 for entities run by the Gupta family4 (KPMG, 2017; Malope, van Rensburg 
& Dlwati, 2017). Following the allegations, the firm lost four of its larger clients within a 
week and the Finance Minister has instructed state-owned entities to review any work 
that the firm has performed (Malope et al., 2017).   
As a result of the allegations, an independent investigation into KPMG South Africa 
was launched by KPMG international (KPMG, 2017; KPMG International, 2017). As at 
15th September 2017, KPMG South Africa staff had not been found guilty of any illegal 
actions or corruption (KPMG, 2017). However, KPMG South Africa released a 
statement on the findings of the investigation, in which the firm admitted that its work 
performed did “[fall] considerably short of KPMG’s standards” and announced a series 
of leadership changes (KPMG, page 1, 2017). According to the National Treasury, the 
developments have undermined auditor independence in South Africa and have thus 
reaffirmed its belief that MAFR should be implemented (Malope et al., 2017). As at 
November 2017, the major clients that have retired KPMG as its auditor as a result of 
the allegations include Sygnia, The Foschini Group and AVI (Crotty, 2017; Planting, 
2017). AVI has said that it will not reappoint KPMG after its 2017 financial year (Crotty, 
                                            
4 The Guptas are a family from India that relocated to South Africa in 1993 (BBC, 2016). The family has 
had close business connections with the current South African President’s family and is accused of 
wielding a large political influence in South Africa (BBC, 2016). 
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2017). Both Sygnia and The Foschini Group have appointed Deloitte as the new 
auditor and AVI has yet to appoint a new auditor for its 2018 financial year. Therefore, 
in light of the notion that MAFR could help to promote market concentration, it would 
seem that companies are tending to appoint another Big Four audit firm when it comes 
to rotation, therefore, not reducing market concentration. 
CONCLUSION   
From the literature reviewed, various conclusions can be drawn about the 
effectiveness of MAFR in promoting auditor independence and enhancing audit 
quality. Globally, it appears that many different countries are in various stages of 
considering, implementing and/or discontinuing MAFR. These mixed responses to 
MAFR as a policy seem to indicate as lack of conclusive evidence regarding whether 
MAFR is the best solution to promoting auditor independence. On the one hand, 
academic arguments exist in favour of MAFR (Daniels & Booker, 2011; Dopuch et al., 
2001; Harris & Whisenant, 2012; Zhang, 1999). On the other hand, South African 
auditing industry professionals appear to be against the policy’s implementation, noting 
that auditor independence in South Africa is sufficient (Bourne, 2017; Chourdhury, 
2017; Hoole, 2016; Shango, 2017). Recent South African developments, namely those 
relating to KPMG, could, however, counter this notion and consequently support the 
IRBA’s concerns regarding auditor independence.  
Despite differing conclusions regarding MAFR, the issues and considerations raised 
by both proponents and opponents of MAFR are similar. As such, the following five 
common and recurring themes have been identified in the literature and are 
summarised below:  
• Benefits and costs of MAFR and the related impact on audit quality  
• The role of the audit committee in ensuring auditor independence   
• The current status of auditor independence in South Africa  
• Market concentration and transformation considerations for MAFR in South 
Africa 
• Audit fee related issues, including lowballing, and their impact on audit quality 




CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this study is to explore and document the perspectives of South 
African audit committee members on MAFR. In order to focus on audit committee 
members’ perspectives on MAFR in depth, information in addition to that acquired 
through the responses to the IRBA’s consultation letter needs to be obtained. One 
such way of obtaining this data is through in-person interviews. As such, the researcher 
conducted in-person interviews with a sample of audit committee members using the 
method that is described below. The other advantage of in-person interviews is that 
anonymity is guaranteed and, therefore, the interview might provide a more in-depth 
perspective than a response letter submitted to the IRBA (Fontaine et al., 2015).  
Various themes have been identified through consideration of the academic literature 
on MAFR, the points raised by the IRBA in the consultation paper and the interested 
and affected parties’ responses to the IRBA. These themes were predominantly issues 
surrounding MAFR raised by the various sources of literature, for which conflicting 
views and conclusions exist. Considering the prevailing themes in the literature review, 
research questions were proposed that are linked to these themes. The themes 
identified together with the research questions are presented in Table 1. For the 
purposes of achieving a logical flow of interview questions and the analysis of results, 
the order of the themes has been modified in this chapter from the order presented in 
Chapter Two. These themes and research questions form the framework according to 




Table 1: Themes and Research Questions
Theme identified Research question(s) 




1.1. How do audit committee members in South Africa perceive 
the current status of auditor independence?  
1.2. Do audit committee members believe the current measures in 
place to promote independence are sufficient?  
2. The role of the 
audit committee in 
ensuring auditor 
independence.  
2.1. Do audit committee members believe that audit committees 
are effective in promoting auditor independence?  
2.2. What impact do audit committee members believe MAFR will 
have on the role of the audit committee in ensuring auditor 
independence?  
3. Benefits and costs 
of MAFR and the 
related impact on 
audit quality.  
3.1. What impact will MAFR have on audit quality in South Africa?  
3.2. What costs (monetary and non-monetary) do audit committee 
members believe will result from MAFR and do these costs 
exceed the intended benefits?  
4. Audit fee related 
issues, including 
lowballing, and 
their impact on 
audit quality.  
4. How will MAFR affect audit fees, including the practice of 






MAFR in South 
Africa. 
5.1. What affect will MAFR have on the market concentration of 
the auditing environment? 
5.2. Will MAFR help to promote the transformation of the auditing 
profession in South Africa?  
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In order to answer the research questions listed above, semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken. In this way, the researcher was able to explore and understand the 
breadth of issues and opinions around the adoption of MAFR in South Africa.  
Semi-structured interviews involve the development of predetermined questions which 
allow the interviewer to further explore the responses of the interviewees (Doody & 
Noonan, 2012). Thus, this approach does not limit respondents to a predetermined 
set of answers (Dearnley, 2005). According to Schultze and Avital (2011), interviews 
are different from other research methods in that they engage interviewees directly 
with the interviewer, resulting in first-person accounts and interpretations of the 
interviewees’ lived experiences. The open nature of the questions also helps new 
concepts to emerge by encouraging depth and vitality (Dearnley, 2005). 
POPULATION AND PARTICIPANT SELECTION      
The population of this study is audit committee members of South African listed 
companies. Given that the audit committee plays an important role in the corporate 
governance of a company (Dobija, 2013), the perspectives of audit committee 
members on MAFR could be useful for regulators in determining whether to pursue a 
policy of MAFR. Globally, the perspectives of audit committee members on MAFR 
have only been explored in one paper by Fontaine et al. (2015), which is discussed 
briefly in the literature review. No such studies exist yet in a South African context. 
Audit committee members will be referred to as “members” for the remainder of this 
study.  
To select the sample, a technique called “purposive sampling” was used. According 
to Tongco (2007), purposive sampling is a type of non-probability sampling that does 
not rely on statistical sampling but rather on the judgement of the researcher. In other 
words, subjective methods are used to determine the sample selection (Etikan, Musa, 
& Alkassim, 2016). Purposive sampling is useful for researching an area comprising 
knowledgeable experts (Tongco, 2007). This technique involves selecting informants, 
in this case interviewees, based on the qualifications, qualities and/or experience that 
they possess (Etikan et al., 2016; Tongco, 2007). In this way, the quality of the data 
gathered, therefore, relies on the purposive sample chosen (Tongco, 2007). The 
interviewer should thus concentrate on selecting reliable and competent interviewees 
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who are capable of assisting with the relevant research (Etikan et al., 2016; Tongco, 
2007).  
To purposively select the sample used in this research project, a homogenous 
sampling method was employed. Homogeneous sampling involves the selection of 
interviewees who share similar characteristics or experiences (Etikan et al., 2016). 
Only members of South African listed entities were selected, as the requirement to 
mandatorily rotate audit firms only applies to public interest entities which includes 
listed entities (IRBA, 2009, 2016). The population was simplified to listed entities, 
despite the definition of public interest entities being wider than listed entities, for the 
sake of simplicity. Furthermore, members with 2 years or more experience as audit 
committee members were selected to ensure a sufficient level of experience as an 
audit committee member. This selection process is in line with the tenures of the 
members in the study by Fontaine et al. (2015) and ensures the selection of suitably 
homogenous audit members who share the critical experiences necessary to explore 
the research questions.  
During the process of collecting data through semi-structured interviews, a point was 
reached in the interview process when no new themes of categories emerged. 
According to DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006), this point is referred to as saturation 
and it signals that data collection is complete. Saturation was reached after 22 
members were interviewed (20 of which were in-person interviews and two of which 
were via Skype). Therefore, the sample size of 22 was sufficient for the purposes of 
answering the research questions.  
Access to the members interviewed in this study was obtained through professional 
contacts and referrals. The members interviewed were based in either Cape Town or 
Johannesburg. Given that the majority of South African listed companies are based in 
either Johannesburg or Cape Town, the sample for this study is considered to be a 
fairly representative sample of audit committee members in South Africa 
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2017b). The following is a description of the 22 
members interviewed:  
• Seventeen (77%) have had experience as an audit committee chair (currently 
or previously).   
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• Twenty-two (100%) had a Bachelor of Commerce degree. 
• Six (27%) have a Masters of Commerce degree.  
• Two (9%) had obtained Higher Diplomas in Tax Law. 
• One (5%) had obtained a Masters in Business Administration.   
• Twenty-one (95%) are Chartered Accountants (South Africa).  
• Five (23%) are women. 
• Twenty-two (100%) have been audit committee members of more than one 
company. 
• The public listed entities for which the interviewees are audit committee 
members are situated in various geographic locations within South Africa, 
however, the members are based either in Cape Town or Johannesburg and 
travel to board meetings if necessary.  
The researcher did not note any discrepancies in response themes between members 
who had had experience as an audit committee chair and those who had not, or across 
the members’ financial expertise or qualifications. A description of the sample of 
members of this study is contained in Table 2, including the designation of the 
member, which is used to analyse the results of the interviewees, for example, “Audit 
Committee Member 1”, “Audit Committee Member 2,” etc. These designations are 
abbreviated as “ACM” followed by the number assigned to the member.   
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Table 2: Description of Audit Committee Member Interviewees 
Designation 













ACM 1 3 10 7  CA(SA) Cape Town  
ACM 2 2 7 7 CA(SA), MCom  Cape Town  
ACM 3 2 10 6 CA(SA) Cape Town  
ACM 4 1 5 5 CA(SA) Cape Town  
ACM 5 2 8 8 CA(SA), MCom, BA, LLB, FCIS Cape Town  
ACM 6  6 7 5 CA(SA), BCom(Hons) Cape Town  
ACM 7 4 9 5  CA(SA), MCom, HDip, Tax Law Johannesburg 
ACM 8  2 3 3 CA(SA), BCom(Hons Cape Town  
ACM 9 3 3 2.5 CA(SA), BCom(Hons) Cape Town  
ACM 10 3 2 1.5 CA(SA), MCom, HDip Tax Law, 
HDip Business Processing 
Johannesburg  
ACM 11  2  9 8.5 CA(SA), BCom(Hons) Johannesburg  
ACM 12  2 8 6 CA(SA), BCom(Hons) Cape Town  
ACM 13  2 15 11.5 BCom, MCom, FCMA, FIBSA Johannesburg  
ACM 14  2 12 11 CA(SA) Johannesburg  
ACM 15  6 4.5 3.5 CA(SA) Johannesburg  
ACM 16  4 4.5 4.5 CA(SA) Cape Town  
ACM 17  5 11 8 CA(SA), MBA  Cape Town  
ACM 18 3 7 7 CA(SA), MCom  Johannesburg  
ACM 19  3 6  5.5  CA(SA) Cape Town  
ACM 20  5 9 8 CA(SA), BCom(Hons), CMS 
(Oxford)   
Cape Town  
ACM 21 6 14 9 CA(SA), CD(SA) Johannesburg  
ACM 22 8 8.5  6 CA(SA) Johannesburg 
                                            
5 This column refers to the total number of companies for which the member has sat on the audit 
committee during the member’s lifetime (not necessarily simultaneously). Previous positions and 
current positions are included.    
6 This column refers to the longest audit committee position tenure that the member has held with an 




In the interviews, the members and interviewer commonly refer to the “Big Four” audit 
firms and mid- and small-tier audit firms. The “Big Four” audit firms include Ernst & 
Young (EY), KPMG, Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which are the 
major global accounting firms (ICAEW, 2017). Mid-tier and small-tier audit firms are 
those firms, other than the Big Four, that are classified as mid-tier or small-tier 
depending on factors such as resources and capabilities, global presence and size 
(ICAEW, 2017). In light of recent events regarding auditor independence in South 
Africa, it is worth noting that the interviews were conducted before the KPMG incident 
in 2017. These developments are discussed in the subsection on MAFR in a South 
African context in Chapter Two.  
INTERVIEW PROCESS  
In order to conduct the interviews, predetermined, semi-structured questions were 
constructed. The predetermined questions were developed from the research 
questions which were, in turn, drawn from the themes identified in the literature (refer 
to Table 1). For the purposes of developing these questions and for the analysis to 
follow, a grounded theory approach was implemented, allowing the researcher to 
develop theories as research was being performed (Strauss & Corbin, 1997). This set 
of standard questions was then used to guide the discussion, whilst opportunities for 
the interviewer and interviewee to further explore a response were also allowed.  
Pilot interviews were conducted to determine whether the interview questions needed 
to be revised. The interviewer found that the proposed interview questions were 
adequate in answering the research questions. Therefore, no changes were made to 
the original draft of questions. The interview questions can be found in Appendix 1. 
The researcher was present at each interview and could both lead the interview and 
take notes during the interview. The average interview duration was 33 minutes with 
a minimum duration of 19 minutes and a maximum duration of 54 minutes. Ethical 
clearance was obtained prior to conducting the interviews via the College of 
Accounting of the University of Cape Town. Each interview was recorded electronically 
after each participant had signed a consent form agreeing to the interview being 
recorded. All the recorded interviews were then transcribed. The interviewer confirmed 
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the accuracy of the transcriptions by simultaneously listening to the audio recordings 
whilst reading the transcribed interview. No discrepancies, other than the spelling of 
industry terminology, were noted.  
There is a low risk in terms of researcher bias because the interviewer is an academic 
with no personal or financial interest in whether MAFR is adopted in South Africa. 
Consequently, all questions posed to the members, the analysis of responses and 
documentation thereof were performed objectively.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The results from the interviews conducted in this study are presented and analysed 
below. The interviewer applied the methodology described in Chapter 3: Research 
Methodology, to the documents containing the transcripts of the interviews in order to 
obtain the results. The results are presented according to the framework developed in 
the said methodology chapter, whereby themes were identified in the literature review 
and research questions formulated, from which interview questions were accordingly 
developed. The themes are presented in the same order in which they were identified 
in the framework. As such, the results are presented according to the following key 
themes:  
1. The current status of auditor independence in South Africa. 
2. The role of the audit committee in ensuring auditor independence.   
3. Benefits and costs of MAFR and the related impact on audit quality.  
4. Audit fee related issues, including lowballing, and their impact on audit quality. 
5. Market concentration and transformation considerations for MAFR in South 
Africa.  
5.1. THE CURRENT STATUS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Of the 22 members interviewed, 17 (77%) believed that there is no problem with the 
current status of auditor independence in South Africa. ACMs 6, 9 and 14 agreed that 
independence was adequate at the Big Four Firms but were concerned about 
independence at the non-Big Four Firms.  
Many members raised the point that in terms of independence, “… one [has] got to be 
actually looking at the people” (ACM 1). The current rotation systems in place within 
the firms conducting the audit mean that the audit team working for a particular client 
at any given time is sufficiently independent. “…[A]s a matter of course the clerks who 
are engaged, the associates who work on the audit, are naturally all growing and they 
are changing their role, changing their position so they will get more senior every year, 
so… [doing] different bits of the work as they grow, and eventually most of them leave 
to go to other… [firms or jobs]” (ACM 1). This means that the audit team generally 
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does not consist of the same individuals for an extended period of time and there are 
“new eyes on it [the audit] the whole time” (ACM 1). Additionally, members noted other 
means of ensuring independence, such as having a senior partner review the other 
partners’ work and a quality assurance partner, who never personally meets with the 
client, providing additional reviews.  
ACM 20 
“I think it’s very good and I’ve been through a number of scenarios where audit 
firms have had to propose for the audit work at the large listed companies and 
we have very, particularly in the top level of the audit firms – have got 
independence in those particular organisations. So, you talk of the top-four and 
then the next series beneath the top-four – no issues in my opinion of 
independence.” 
ACM 3 
“I am not aware of any issues with auditor independence. In my personal 
experience, I find that the firms take the issue of audit independence 
quite seriously. I definitely get the sense that it is part of the firm’s internal 
quality control processes, and in my capacity as Chairman of the audit 
committee, it is something that they draw to my attention often in a 
practical way. I don’t think there is an issue.”  
A few audit committee members also mentioned the fact that auditors and companies 
are both subject to legislation that exists to promote the independence of auditors. 
Such legislation includes the Companies Act, s94 which requires the company’s audit 
committee to review the independence of the external auditor. Listed companies are 
also required to comply with King IV, which sets out guidelines on how the audit 
committee should assess the independence of the auditors. The majority of members 
believed that “there are so many statues and regulations that companies and auditors, 
and audit committees… have to comply with” to ensure auditor independence and 
thus implementing MAFR is not “… going to change anything in that respect [with 




“The Audit Committee and the Board’s duties, as far as [the] independence of 
the auditors is concerned, are very well defined through a number of things, 
[such as the] Company’s Act, the JSE Listings Requirements and King IV. It’s 
very well defined there and it’s a very clear set of guidelines and, in addition to 
that, you’ve got Audit Committees, in following those guidelines, to think very 
deeply about the independence of the auditors and they’ve taken a direction 
where they must use their discretion in a very wise way in thinking about that. 
So, I think there’s enough guidance given to Audit Committees in order to make 
their auditor independence decisions.” 
Additionally, ACM 4 commented on how “… there is so much reputation at play” and 
that “…reputation is money.” Therefore, fraudulent behaviour on the part of the auditor 
or the client could result in that person “…[losing] bucket-loads of money” (ACM 4). 
Factors such as the legal consequences that could face a negligent or fraudulent 
auditor and the potential damage to the auditor’s reputation, were considered strong 
enough to dissuade an auditor from not acting independently.  
ACM 14 
“… the censures within the large firms for those partners on an individual 
basis are so severe these days that, you know, it is not worth a partner’s 
career and future, to be honest, to give an incorrect [opinion] or an 
opinion simply to please a client these days.”  
ACM 18 
“I think auditors are also cautious because of professional integrity 
requirements, the risk of litigation… so generally auditors look thoroughly 
at the risks.”  
Despite these assurances, two of the 22 audit committee members interviewed (9%) 
believed that auditor independence in South Africa still needs to be improved. ACM 
21 noted that listed companies’ audit committees are often comprised of former 
partners from the incumbent audit firm, indicating a possible “structural issue” (see 




“Okay, well it [auditor independence] does need to be fixed. It needs 
improvement because the make-up of the audit committees is basically, 
largely made-up of the former partners of the incumbent auditors. I think 
there’s a problem… They’re an ex-incumbent audit firm, so you can see 
then that it really becomes a problem. So, because of those structural 
issues, I think something has to be done… So, there is perceived lack of 
independence…”  
ACM 21 also noted that the strong disagreement of CEOs of companies affected 
by the implementation of MAFR indicates a possible independence issue. 
According to the participant, auditors are the “suppliers” of a “service” and that 
service can be performed by any auditor, not only the incumbent auditor. Many 
CEOs and governing structures have been “fight[ing] for their auditors” and, 
consequently, the auditors’ independence is questionable.  
ACM 7 believed that auditors are currently lacking independence and that there 
is a lack of “questions”, or perhaps measures, that challenge the independence 
of the auditor. Consequently, this participant believed that additional measures 
need to be introduced to prevent the further erosion of auditor independence. 
ACM 7 
“My view is that I don’t think there are questions really which have 
manifested in certain misdemeanours or certain behaviours challenging 
the whole question of auditor independence… The issue is that sadly, 
over time, auditors have been found to have been lacking on such 
matters [independence]. And I think in order to help the auditing 
profession… steps need to be taken to make sure that we prevent these 
things [the erosion of auditor independence] before…disasters occur.” 
When asked whether long audit tenure could potentially lead the auditors to issue a 
biased or inappropriate audit report, 21 of the 22 members (95%) interviewed believed 
that this was not the case. Some members agreed that, whilst in theory long audit 
tenure could lead to the impairment of independence, in practice the natural rotation 
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of the audit team prevents this. ACM 5 explained how this notion “…presumes that 
everything is static within an audit company or an audit firm, whereas it’s not 
because you are getting new article clerks, they want for better trainees coming, 
you have change of partners, it is a fluid environment.”  As a result, long audit 
tenure for the firm does not imply long audit tenure for the individual team members. 
In this light, members noted that partner rotation has been a positive step towards 
improving auditor independence, but firm rotation is something very different. With 
partner rotation, independence is still maintained, and a fresh set of eyes is brought 
onto the audit every five years, but the benefit of client specific experience and 
knowledge remains.  
A few members also noted that, even when long audit tenure has the potential 
to impair independence, the audit firms and the companies have many checks 
and balances in place to prevent this from happening. ACM 14 listed such 
checks and balances, which includes “…a review partner of some sort… often 
whom you as a client never get to see… [meaning that] behind the scenes you 
know that there is someone who is reviewing key and critical and potentially 
controversial issues where calls need to be made…”. Additionally, “… the 
censures within the large firms for those partners on an individual basis [for 
issuing inappropriate audit reports] are so severe these days” (ACM 14). 
Therefore, these censures act to deter auditors from not being independent.  
ACM 3 pointed out that “…relationships [between management and the 
auditors] all change over time.”  Not only does the audit team rotate, so too 
does the group of individuals at the client with which the audit team works. The 
member stated that he/she had had no experience of a long tenure with the 
same audit partner and Chief Financial Officer and suggested that it seemed 
random to make the auditor rotate and not any other individual involved in the 
audit process. In this light, ACM 3 “[did not think] rotating the firm… is 
necessary.” Another member, who has many years of experience as an audit 
partner, also drew attention to how, although some audit firms have been with 
the same client for decades, in general, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief 




“Well I think that is a very sweeping statement. I think it is unlikely [that 
long audit tenure impairs independence] for the reasons I have 
mentioned in the first question, with all the checks and balances... 
Secondly… for example, in… the [IRBA’s] first lot of frequently asked 
questions, [it was stated that] we have audited some firms for 86 years. 
There hasn’t been the same CEO for 86 years.” 
In response to whether long audit tenure could bias the audit opinion, ACM7 
held that view that it might not necessarily bias the audit opinion, however, more 
issues could potentially be discovered by a new auditor and brought to the 
attention of the audit committee. In this way, “a change [in auditor] would 
have… [identified these issues]” and more value could be added to the audit 
through audit firm rotation. 
ACM 21 did agree that long audit tenure had the potential to lead to a biased audit 
report. However, the member qualified that statement by stating that, at the same time, 
a tenure that is too short is also not good. According to ACM 21, it takes a few years 
for the audit partner to understand the client. Switching audit firms too soon would 
mean that this process is repeated too often. ACM 21 clarified that he/she considers 
any audit tenure longer than 10 years to be too long.  
On the topic of auditor independence in South Africa, some members believed there 
to be a discrepancy between the independence of the Big Four audit firms and the 
medium to small audit firms. The experience of most of the members interviewed was 
primarily with the Big Four audit firms. None of these members believed there to be 
problems with auditor independence at that level. However, some members 
mentioned that independence is more of an issue for the smaller firms.  
One of the primary reasons for this lack of independence is that the larger the audit 
firm, the lower risk of dependence on key clients. With smaller firms, however, there 
is a higher risk that a fee received from a client is large in the context of the small firm’s 
client portfolio. As such, the smaller firm is more likely to be influenced by the wishes 




“… I really haven’t ever felt that there is a problem at all of auditor 
independence in South Africa particularly with regards to the large firms, 
and one of the advantages of being large is that if you are large enough, 
no client is large enough to influence you… Auditor independence, in my 
view, is much more relevant if you are a small firm and you have 
individual clients who are significant in the context of your practice as a 
whole in terms of fees or reputation or so on.” 
ACM 9 
“… I have got a big firm experience from Deloitte’s and KPMG. And certainly, 
there I don’t believe there is any doubt about audit firm independence but, 
certainly lower down, someone called Graham Maddock, who you might recall 
having seen his name in the press, spent a little bit of time in jail, [relating to] 
the Fidentia account… He pitched up at a braai with a 4x4, and said “no, a client 
had given that to him.” This is probably what… like twelve to fifteen years ago? 
Anyway, the girls were in the kitchen skinnering7 as they were and I got into big 
trouble because his wife had just been given a big diamond ring… So I believe, 
[regarding] the smaller firms, there is no mistake there. Their independence is 
a different story…”  
ACM 6 spoke about an experience with a company that was being audited by a 
smaller firm. According to ACM 6, “…there… [was] no question that they 
[management of the client] were interested in getting rich quickly but they cut 
corners, they did a number of things that… [ACM 6 thought] were somewhat 
dishonest.” Furthermore, ACM 6 expressed “concern… that the audit firm had 
a relationship with these guys [management] and they [the audit committee] 
were becoming uncomfortable but… [the audit firm was] doing nothing about 
it.” Initially, ACM 6 thought that the reason behind not appointing a Big Four 
audit firm was that it would be too expensive. However, ACM 6 ultimately 
believed that the reason is because a big firm would have “probed too much.” 
                                            
7 “Skinnering” is a South African slang term for gossiping.  
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It was noted by ACM 14 that independence between Big Four firms and small 
firms may be different but the possibility of being negligent, overlooking an 
event or making an error is no different between the two types of firms. 
Overall the results of the interviews provide the following answers to research 
questions 1.1 and 1.2: 
1.1. How do audit committee members in South Africa perceive the current 
status of auditor independence?  
The majority of members did not believe the status of auditor independence in South 
Africa warranted the implementation of MAFR. Two members did, however, feel 
strongly that independence of auditors has been eroded and that the implementation 
of MAFR could help to prevent further erosion. Some of the members who believed 
that auditor independence was adequate did note that this practice applied to the 
larger audit firms to a greater extent than the smaller audit firms. The discrepancies 
between the independence of small, medium and large audit firms could be an area 
for further research. 
1.2. Do audit committee members believe that the measures currently in place 
to promote independence are sufficient?  
In line with the notion that the members believe that there are no problems with auditor 
independence in South Africa, the majority of members are satisfied with the current 
measures in place to promote auditor independence and believe that they are 
sufficient to ensure ethical behaviour.  
5.2. THE ROLE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE  
With regard to the role played by the audit committee in ensuring auditor 
independence, many members expressed concern that MAFR would diminish this 
role. Most members were of the opinion that the current measures to ensure auditor 
independence, including the functions of the audit committee, were sufficient and that 
auditor independence was not a problem in South Africa.  
The first point raised by many members was that the provisions of the Companies Act 
and King IV, governing audit committees, are sufficient. The duties of audit committee 
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members according to the Companies Act (section 94(7) and (8)) relate mainly to 
ensuring auditor independence. As such, the majority of members believed that the 
current audit committee mechanisms in place are sufficient to ensure auditor 
independence. If audit committees function effectively and fulfill their role as intended 
by the Companies Act and King IV, a financial report user should be satisfied with the 
independence of the external auditor. ACM 3 held the view that IRBA’s belief that the 
current measures to ensure auditor independence in South Africa are not sufficient is 
“quite insulting to both audit firms and audit committees.”  The IRBA’s belief would 
imply that audit committees are “not doing their jobs” (ACM 3) sufficiently in terms of 
the Companies Act and King IV.  
ACM 8  
“… One of the most important roles of an Audit Committee is to ensure that 
you appoint the right auditors and that they are independent... So you’ve 
got to ask yourself the question, “is this actually a questioning of Audit 
Committees [effectiveness]…?” The Audit Committees that I’ve been on 
always have been acting very independently and been independently 
minded and have followed their duty in the law...” 
Some of the members discussed how MAFR could perhaps inhibit the decision-
making abilities of the entity. Firstly, the members noted that the concept of 
independence is one that requires professional judgment. A “legal requirement 
[exists]… that says the audit committee is responsible for making these [auditor 
appointment] decisions” (ACM 2). By being forced to rotate firms every 10 
years, the audit committee might be “… [forced into] a position where… [it has 
to] appoint someone else” (ACM 2) other than the auditor that it deems most 
appropriate for the client. This requirement, therefore, limits the ability of the 
audit committee to exercise complete professional judgement in the year of 
rotation. In this sense, MAFR would potentially diminish the role of the audit 
committee. 
Two of the members interviewed, however, agreed with the IRBA and felt that 
current audit committee mechanisms ensuring auditor independence were not 
sufficient. According to ACM 7, auditors are regular human beings and are not 
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immune to familiarity threats. Consequently, it should not be left to the audit 
committee and auditors to self-regulate the auditor’s independence, but 
independence should rather be regulated externally with a policy, such as 
MAFR. In this way, there would be a “separation of power” (ACM 7), which 
would better ensure independence. The same member claimed that it is very 
rare for audit committees to voluntarily tender the audit, which the member 
believed to be evidence that perhaps independence is an issue. 
Some members added that the ability of the audit committee to ensure auditor 
independence depended on the composition and competence of its members. It was 
noted that more independent and financially literate audit committee members would 
be more capable of fulfilling their role as an audit committee member. A point was 
raised by ACM 14 that individual audit committee members also have their “personal 
reputations to preserve.” A member’s reputation plays a large role in the member’s 
credibility and most competent audit committee members will be very cautious of 
anything negatively affecting their reputation.  
ACM 1 
“…If you have got a competent set of [audit committee] members who 
are experienced and skilled sufficiently, they are well-equipped to 
determine the independence, and not only the independence but equally, 
and probably far more importantly, the competence of the auditors to 
actually do the audit…”  
ACM 14 
“…If you make a mistake, you know it follows you… Errors follow you… 
So one of the most important things is to remember that individual audit 
committee members also have their personal reputations to preserve… 
A very strong aspect of ensuring independence is simply the judgement 
of the audit committee members.”   
In terms of the composition of the audit committee, ACM 4 suggested that  
ex-auditors, excluding the auditor who has acted as the designated auditor for 
the entity within the past 3 years as this would impair independence, tend to be 
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valuable audit committee members. This is because  
ex-auditors understand the audit process and where the audit risks would be 
and, therefore, can ask the right questions. ACM 4 suggested that it would be 
useful for at least one of the audit committee members to be an ex-auditor. 
Likewise, ACM 11 emphasized that audit committees need a strong chairman 
and that they believed the strongest chairmen came out of the auditing 
profession. ACM 11’s reasons also included the notion that ex-auditors have a 
strong technical background and are thus more able to challenge the incumbent 
auditors and management. 
ACM 11 
“I think that audit committee’s need a very strong chairman and I believe 
the best audit committee Chairman comes out of the profession.  
Somebody who has spent their life in the profession… You need a strong 
chair with a good technical breakdown, who can challenge the auditors, 
who can challenge the CFO, who can act in a meditating capacity if they 
have to.” 
The results of this section provide the following answers to research questions 
2.1 and 2.2: 
 2.1. Do audit committee members believe that audit committees are 
effective in promoting auditor independence?  
Ultimately, the general consensus among the members was that audit 
committees are currently fulfilling their mandate effectively. Furthermore, the 
common view held was that the current audit committee mechanisms are 
sufficient to ensure auditor independence. Some members did, however, note 
that the effectiveness of the committee depends, to an extent, on its 
composition and competence. Two members believed that the audit committee 
does not sufficiently promote auditor independence and that its role could be 
complemented by MAFR.  
2.2. What impact do audit committee members believe MAFR will have on 
the role of the audit committee in ensuring auditor independence? 
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A few members commented on how MAFR could diminish the role of the audit 
committee. As a result of being forced to ‘rotate off’ a firm and having to appoint 
another firm, the committee might be forced to appoint an auditor who it does 
not believe is the most appropriate for the client. In this way, MAFR could 
negatively impact the role of the audit committee in selecting, according to its 
professional judgment, the auditor most suited to the client.  
5.3. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MAFR AND THE RELATED IMPACT 
ON AUDIT QUALITY  
When asked whether they believed the intended benefits could exceed the expected 
costs of MAFR, 20 of the 22 (91%) members interviewed were uncertain as to what 
the benefits of MAFR would be in South Africa. Three of these members stated that 
they believed there are no benefits. Consequently, the general view held by the 
members interviewed, barring the two members who believed that auditor 
independence in South Africa needs improvement, was that the costs of MAFR would 
exceed any intended benefits.  
ACM 13 
“As I said I don’t think there will be benefits. I think… it will be a negative 
quality that you will get out of it.”   
ACM 5 
“The cost would be significantly high, and then one presumes that there 
are going to be benefits, whereas I don’t agree with that… You are just 
looking at higher costs and not necessarily benefits.” 
A potential benefit of MAFR was raised by ACM 8 in that a new audit team will 
bring a fresh set of eyes and may ask new questions. This benefit occurs as a 
result of the different perspectives of the new audit team. ACM 8 did, however, 
note that this result is already achieved with audit partner rotation and 
furthermore, there is a continuity in the auditors’ understanding of their client 




“[Audit quality] will be weaker in the beginning, with the one advantage 
that new questions will be asked, that haven’t been asked before 
because people look at it with new perspectives… [With audit partner 
rotation], new questions are asked but the total audit team behind the 
partner is not ripped apart, so you still have some continuity in the 
understanding of the company.” 
Ultimately, the members interviewed did not discuss many benefits of MAFR, 
apart from the potential benefits relating to market concentration and 
transformation, which will be discussed under a later theme.  
Many costs and concerns, however, were raised by the members. A common concern 
was that of the loss of institutional knowledge. Audit firms build up an understanding 
and knowledge base of the client over the years in which they are the incumbent 
auditors. This knowledge is important and vital in order for the auditor to perform an 
effective audit. Such knowledge includes the understanding of the client’s business 
model, the environment in which the client operates, the financial reporting system of 
the client and, hence, where the key risks lie. Many members argued that with partner 
rotation, a fresh set of eyes is brought onto the audit and independence is maintained. 
At the same time, the institutional knowledge, understanding of the client and working 
papers still remain within the audit team. The whole audit team does not rotate at once, 
meaning that the understanding can filter down through the team and individual 
members are promoted or change positions. Audit firm rotation, however, brings about 
a situation where the audit firm has to start from scratch, and build up that institutional 
knowledge from the beginning. As this understanding takes a few years to build up, in 
terms of audit quality, detection risk and, thus, audit quality is lower in the first few 
years following a rotation.  
The issue of auditors having to face a steeper learning curve in the first few years of 
the audit links to the issue of audit fees discussed in the previous subsection. Unless 
audit fees are increased to the extent that the client absorbs the increased costs of 
the auditor having to spend more time and resources in order to understand the client, 
the audit firm will face a high level of loss absorption in the first few years of the audit. 
In this case, there is a risk that corners might be cut leading to a lower level of 
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assurance. Furthermore, as discussed above, audit firm rotation might not be 
financially healthy for the profession.  
ACM 20 
“Well, the biggest cost you’re going to face if… you bring in a new firm, 
is [that] they don’t have the knowledge that the other firm has got… So 
now as an Audit Committee you’ve got to rely on their opinion… In order 
for them to give you their sound-opinion they’re going to have to do a lot 
of research. In order to do that it’s going to cost them a hell of a lot more 
money...” 
ACM 12  
“If you are going to have MAFR, the incoming firm is going to ask or 
repeat a whole lot of stuff which is part of the institutional knowledge, as 
it were, of the departing firm. And they [the incoming firm] are going to 
have to rebuild from scratch that kind of institutional memory... So you 
are just going to repeat that exercise every so many years, which is 
stupid.” 
ACM 22 tied this issue into a potential cost that he/she foresees for non-
executive directors. He/she expressed concern that, due to “the learning 
curve… [being] so high… you’re [the audit committee] probably only going to 
get meaningful, value-add contribution from the auditors, from the second, if 
not the third year.” This could potentially hinder the audit committee’s ability to 
act as a form of assurance for the shareholders. 
ACM 11 raised the point that different industries face specific industry issues, 
which impact on the way in which the audit is conducted. As such, firms who 
audit a client in a specific industry for a long time become industry specialists, 
thus allowing them to conduct an efficient and effective audit. Frequently 
rotating auditing firms will cause this industry specialism to be lost. New 
auditors coming into the industry will need to gain an understanding of the client 
by asking numerous questions of management and spending time conducting 
research. ACM 11 also commented on how this practice could also necessitate 
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the client’s management having to spend time supplying information on 
situations that the previous auditors understood and, thus, leading to their 
irritation with the new auditors.  
ACM 11  
“I think that they would come up with… some very good questions, to 
which the previous auditor probably knows the answer. You know you 
get industry specific things that is the way the industry works... Why 
doesn’t the gold industry ever have any debtors? Well because we pay 
in 2 or 3 days that is the rule. You know you have got to ask all sorts of 
questions and you are going to distract the CFO, the staff are going to 
get really pissed off [sic] with you [the incoming auditor]. It seems like 
only the other day we were explaining all this to new auditors.” 
An additional cost of MAFR could present itself in the form of multinational 
complexities. ACM 17 illustrated how many multinational companies have 
subsidiaries or branches in South Africa that need to be audited. These 
multinational companies often have holding companies situated in jurisdictions, 
such as the United States of America and various countries in Asia, that do not 
require mandatory audit firm rotation. ACM 17 pointed out it is unlikely that the 
whole group of companies will rotate their auditors globally because a subsidiary 
of the group is required to do so in South Africa. This would then result in 
subsidiaries being audited by other audit firms, which could lead to additional audit 
costs. In this regard, ACM 17 believed that the IRBA “[didn’t] seem to have thought 
it [MAFR] through.” 
Different audit firms performing various functions for different clients was raised as a 
potential issue by five of the members interviewed (23%). ACM 3 pointed out that the 
majority of the listed companies employ different audit firms to perform various 
services for the company that may not be performed by the external assurance 
provider. For example, a company could have one firm employed as its IT service 
provider, another employed as its tax adviser, another employed as the internal auditor 
and another working on its service level arrangements. If the company is required to 
rotate its external auditor, ACM 3 believes that “the knock-on effect [… would be] really 
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significant [… because the rotation would] have to happen simultaneously” between 
all the service providers. The other four members supported this notion and elaborated 
on it by pointing out that it might lead to companies not appointing the most suitable 
audit firm for the various functions due to independence issues.  
ACM 16 
“[It will be] chaos, because… an audit firm… cannot do certain consulting work 
or certain work [within] a year or two years, whatever the period is, [of having 
been the external auditor]. So, I am thinking it is going to make it very difficult… 
[as the company] may be forced to… appoint a firm for the wrong reasons… 
Maybe… under the circumstances, because of independence issues [ and the 
company has] other firms doing the tax work and internal audit, you may be left 
only with one firm and maybe they are not the right choice.”  
ACM 10 alluded to how he/she looks at the cultural fit, or “personality” fit between the 
company and the audit firm and how MAFR could force the company to appoint an 
auditor where the fit is not ideal.  
ACM 10 
“… There are normally… all four big firms involved in various circumstances. 
Taxation one firm, internal audit another firm, management advisory services 
[another firm] and then your [external] audit firm and what happens then is, you 
can see… the culture of the various firms. Sometimes the culture and the 
personality… [fit with the] firms is actually the most important thing... It is not 
about independence or non-independence, it is just about the fact how they go 
about doing work.”  
On a related note, ACM 3 believed that audit firms might move away from assurance 
services towards providing more non-assurance services in future. ACM 3 pointed out 
that often “a lot of audit firms make more of their money from not doing external 
assurance, and more of it from consulting”. Non-assurance providers are subject to 
lower risk and will not be subject to MAFR, thus making the service more appealing 
than providing external assurance.  
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ACM 15 also touched on a notion in which the Big Four audit firms would start 
“shrinking” as a result of MAFR. ACM 15 illustrated this notion through an example 
using the audit firms and banks. According to ACM 15, certain financial expertise is 
needed by an audit firm to audit a bank. Since there is no requirement in terms of 
MAFR that states that if a firm ‘rotates-off’ a bank, the firm must ‘rotate-onto’ another 
bank, the firm might be left with no banking audits. However, the firm is left with the 
individuals who would have performed the audit, who are banking specialists. Instead 
of waiting until the audit firm is next ‘rotated-onto’ a bank, these individuals may leave 
to pursue careers within the banks themselves, thus resulting in the audit firm losing 
its banking expertise.   
Another common concern among many of the members revolved around the time that 
would be consumed by various parties as a result of the audit tender process. In terms 
of the audit committee, the audit committee members would need to spend more time 
dealing with audit tenders, which, according to ACM 3, are “time consuming and 
stressful”. Often during times of audit tenures, more time is required of audit committee 
members as non-executive directors because a tender requires additional work. ACM 
2 pointed out that this could potentially decrease the appeal of being an audit 
committee member going forward. Furthermore, ACM 13 believed that the time and 
effort put into the audit tenders would have no impact on audit quality, given that the 
audit committee would most likely appoint another Big Four audit firm, the audit quality 
of which tends to be of a similar standard to the other Big Four firms.  
 
 ACM 12 
“There may be a cost in terms of the focus of the audit committee’s time... 
They sometimes refer to it [audit tendering] in a rather sexist phrase – 
[the] beauty parade… Somebody [a member of the audit committee] has 
got to put together a document which explains exactly what the audit 
entails. That has got to get distributed to the audit firms. They then are 
going to produce their presentations, which you are going to spend a few 
hours going through before the special meeting which gets called, in 
order for them to give the presentation… Then they tell you how 
wonderful they are, and you have then got to interrogate that and, as a 
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committee, decide on what you are going to do. So… [the committee is] 
going to spend a fair amount of time on it [the tender process] ...”.  
Another common concern in terms of time consumption was the time that the client 
would need to spend re-educating the auditor after each rotation. A few of the 
members explained how the client needs to sit with the new auditor to help the auditor 
gain an understanding of the business, its financial reporting system and controls, in 
order for the auditor to perform an efficient audit. This process is time consuming and 
would need to occur far more regularly with MAFR.  
ACM 4 pointed out that this would be particularly cumbersome for smaller public 
interest entities. These entities might not have a large staff to begin with, meaning that 
their management team might have more time constraints, making it more difficult to 
spend time educating auditors. In terms of the listed clients, ACM 12 commented on 
the time constrains under which the finance function operates and the deadlines in 
terms of financial reporting. The member noted that MAFR would place this function 
under greater pressure given the time the finance function would need to spend with 
the auditors.  
ACM 3 
“From the client’s perspective, it [the rotation of an audit firm] is hugely 
time consuming. You know, the staff have to explain stuff over and over 
again. There is no institutional knowledge that is retained [from the 
previous auditor]. So I think the cost from a time perspective is huge.”  
ACM 4 
“… At the head office, we didn’t have a hell of a lot of staff, and the staff 
just don’t have the time to keep re-educating the auditors. So there is a 
cost pressure or time pressure on the company itself. And we were listed, 
so in terms of the listing requirements… [we had] deadlines to get… [our] 
results out. So it just adds a hell of a lot of stress… [to] the whole system.” 
Furthermore, the members pointed out that the audit firm’s team itself would 
need to spend a lot of time educating itself on the client’s details. ACM 10 was 
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of the belief that in order “to set up an audit of a new client, you [the audit firm] 
most probably incur set up costs in the order of 50 to 60% of a normal audit 
fee” as a result of the extra hours worked by the audit team. MAFR would result 
in this process occurring more regularly, thus increasing the frequency of 
incurring set up costs for the audit firms. A few members also raised the issue 
that the tendering process for an audit firm itself is time-consuming and costly 
and MAFR would most likely divert resources in terms of time and finance away 
from auditing and towards tendering or marketing.  
In conclusion, the results to this section provide the following answers to 
research questions 3.1 and 3.2:  
3.1. What impact will MAFR have on audit quality in South Africa?  
The majority of members agreed that audit quality is likely to decrease with the 
implementation of MAFR.  
3.2. What costs (monetary and non-monetary) do audit committee 
members believe will result from MAFR and do they exceed the intended 
benefits? 
The most common costs discussed by the members include a loss of 
institutional knowledge due to the rotation of the audit firm, increased time 
spend by the audit team to perform the audit work and increased consumption 
of client management’s time by the auditor. Other common concerns included 
increased time spent by the audit committee relating to audit tenders, 
multinational complexities and difficulties that could arise as a result of various 
firms performing different functions within a company. Ultimately, the majority 
of the members agreed that the costs would exceed the intended benefits of 
MAFR.   
5.4. AUDIT FEE RELATED ISSUES, INCLUDING LOWBALLING, AND 
THEIR RELATED IMPACT ON AUDIT QUALITY  
With regard to the benefits and costs of MAFR, many members discussed the effects 
of the policy on audit fees. The responses were, however, very mixed.  
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Eight of the members were of the opinion that MAFR posed the threat of increased 
lowballing in the audit profession. As a result of more frequent tendering, there will be 
more opportunities for lowballing to occur. ACM 13 pointed out that, even though 
theoretically audit committee members should not only be concerned with the price of 
an audit, price is a real concern, which increases the risk of lowballing. These eight 
members also referred to the risks of lowballing, including the risk that auditors may 
end up “cutting corners” as they will have fewer resources to perform the audit. This 
could include using more junior, less experienced staff in place of more experienced 
staff, which would reduce audit costs but could also reduce audit quality.  
Two of the members also discussed how lower audit fees could make the profession 
unattractive as it will be difficult to retain and attract talent because the audit firms 
might struggle to pay them. This is because there are increased costs in the first few 
years of conducting the audit because the auditor spends more time acquiring 
knowledge of the company. Without an increase in the audit fee, the costs are not 
borne by the clients but rather by the auditing firms. This fact was illustrated by ACM 
11, who compared work outside of the audit environment to work inside the audit 
environment. ACM 11 commented on how, after completing their accounting articles 
at audit firms, “young CAs [chartered accountants] … are going to be attracted… 
[to] what is in the outside world [outside of the auditing profession]” because 
“CAs outside the profession have far limited risk, if any [and] they earn mega 
bucks more than anybody who stays in the profession, and they have a far more 
regulated lifestyle”. As a result, lowballing could lead to professionals choosing to 
leave the audit environment for other jobs. Alternatively, the cost of employing CAs in 
an audit firm will need to increase to keep them within the profession, increasing future 
audit costs. 
One member did, however, confirm that the bigger firms have more resources in 
general and would be less likely to cut corners to preserve their reputations. ACM 4 
argued that smaller firms are more likely to cut corners so as to reduce the losses 
made on the audit. On the other hand, another member believed that lowballing was 
an issue primarily between the Big Four firms, indicating that the practice affects all 




“So [lowballing] will definitely happen… but if any audit committee that 
turns around and says their major reason for appointing an auditor is 
price based, you know, will give me a big worry. I would be very 
concerned about that.  I know pricing is an issue, so it will definitely 
happen.” 
ACM 21 
“Lowballing is real.  It takes place and it’s nauseating… The funny thing 
is that it’s actually done by the big-four firms themselves…” 
ACM 4 
“It really depends on the audit firm. I mean, call it the big four, and then 
the next four if you want to call them that – they are not going to 
jeopardize their reputations by being penny-wise-pound-foolish. But if 
[MAFR is implemented], the smaller firms are definitely going to cut back 
on processes and procedures to not make such a big loss.” 
Another view held by three of the members was that lowballing already exists 
and that MAFR will have no impact on lowballing. ACM 4 described how firms 
lowball to win audits in new sectors and industries to which they have little 
exposure. This could potentially be because the firm is not as familiar with the 
sector and, therefore, determining an appropriate audit fee is more difficult. 
Thus, the firm may unintentionally lowball. 
Eight members felt that MAFR will not have an impact on lowballing due to the 
role that the audit committee plays in auditor selection. According to these 
members, the mandate of the audit committee extends beyond the audit fee to 
issues, such as expertise and capabilities. As a result, a good, strong audit 
committee should see through any lowballing and ultimately select the audit 
firm that is most qualified for the job. 
The role of the audit committee involves considering the audit fee and the 
proposal of the audit firm and considering whether it will be able to recover the 
auditing costs. ACM 1 mentioned the notion of dealing with the lowest bidder 
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at your own peril, implying that audit committee members are aware of the risks 
of selecting an audit firm purely because it is offering the lowest price. On this 
note, two of the members stated that, from their experience as audit committee 
members, one would rather pay a higher audit fee if it will ensure higher audit 
quality. Ultimately, whether lowballing exists or not, these members were of the 
belief that MAFR would not impact the practice of lowballing due to the duties 
and considerations of the audit committee in selecting auditors. 
ACM 16 
“I think yes, MAFR could result in lowballing, and ultimate impacting audit 
quality. But having said that, I am contradicting all this, is that if you have 
an audit committee, a competent audit committee who will see through 
lowballing and will not necessarily accept the lowest fee.” 
ACM 17 
“I mean just first the comment on lowballing, it’s not obvious to me as… 
an audit committee member that we want to have the firm that’s got the 
lowest fees... It may well be, because we need certain work done and we 
need quality in terms of that work, that quality… is way more important 
than the fees… From an audit committee member [perspective], you 
often would prefer to pay a little bit more and make sure that you’re 
getting the right quality.” 
Having commented on the effect that the audit committee’s role has in 
preventing lowballing, two members also noted that for big companies, the audit 
fee is not a big cost for the company. Thus, the cost of changing auditors is 
“negligible in monetary terms” (ACM 12) and, therefore, a slight undercutting in 
the audit fee would not be sufficient incentive for choosing one audit firm over 
another, even from management’s perspective. Consequently, the practice of 




“… People talk a lot about audit costs. But in the scheme of running any 
company, the audit cost is one of the lowest costs in the business. It 
really isn’t a big cost in the business.” 
Another view held by five of the members is that lowballing does not generally 
happen in practice, even when there are voluntarily audit firm rotations. 
Therefore, MAFR will have no impact on the practice. According to ACM 6, 
audit fees charged by the Big Four firms do not differ substantially. This 
statement supports a comment made by ACM 19 that audit fees tend to be 
within 10% of each other. ACM 18 also added that, in recent voluntary audit 
firm rotations, “there was no material difference in the fee”. 
ACM 6 
“[When it comes to audit firm selection], my experience is they would 
probably look for quality [over lower fees]. I say that because I don’t think 
the fee differs much between the top four firms. You know if one firm is 
charging one and a half or a fifteen million audit fee there might be five 
hundred thousand difference between them but it isn’t that significant. 
So… [when changing from one big firm to another], I wouldn’t really 
expect… [there] to be a massive saving in fees.”  
Ultimately, the tendering firm’s fee might be a bit lower than the incumbent 
firm’s fee but generally the difference is not substantial. ACM 20 explains why 
this is by describing how auditors determine the audit fee: “…effectively, when 
you go out to tender now, the four-firms that you go and talk to, that asked to 
tender, will be looking at the fees that have been charged up until that particular 
point in time. Their [the tendering auditors’] fee might come in a little lower but 
it’s not going to be really low compared to the current fees because […] they’re 
working on the basis of what is required in order to give the opinion at the end 
of the day and what, in order to achieve that, is the staffing requirements and 
the time and so on, and they work their fees out on that.” Therefore, audit firms 
tend not to lowball because they are aware of the issues it would cause them 
in future in terms of cost recovery.  
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Furthermore, ACM 20 explained that audit fees normally cannot increase 
beyond inflation, so it would be difficult for the auditors to increase their fees in 
future to recover their costs and compensate for the initial discounted, lowballed 
fee. Thus, “… what they’re doing is they’re compounding their problem over the 
next five-years or however long they’re in for, so they’re not going to come on 
a low-baller.” 
ACM 22 
“… I think low-balling was a factor at some stage in the past. In my 
experience – I haven’t really encountered that in the last number of years, 
simply because firms understand that if they’re going to go in very low, 
well, they are going to sit with that for the next few years… You’re saying 
“well, if you’re coming in at that fee then, well, that’s what you stick with 
for the next two-years, other than your inflationary increase… So, if they 
are lowballing and coming in very low, well, they’re [the audit firms] going 
to pay the price for it, in terms of their level of recovery.”  
ACM 20, however, believed that MAFR would have the “opposite” effect to 
lowballing. He/She explained that fees could end up increasing as a result of 
more frequent rotation because the auditors are aware that they will need to go 
through the learning process with each rotation and that they will only have 10 
years in which to recover their costs. Therefore, auditors will include this 
increased cost into the audit fee in the first few years.  
A potential audit fee benefit of more frequent rotation as a result of MAFR was raised 
by ACM 14. Each rotation offers the audit committee a chance to examine the 
incumbent auditor’s fee and compare it with other firms’ proposed fees, which may 
enable the audit committee to determine the appropriate fee level.  
ACM 14 
“You know what your base fee has been with your incumbent firm for 
many years, so you have a base to start with... And then if you ask 2 or 
3 other firms to propose and their costs are wildly different from that base, 
you have got to ask the question, “how can you do that?”… And at least 
55 
 
that would lead to a very good discussion to try to find out… [whether] 
we been paying too much for a number of years with our incumbent 
firm… It would open up a discussion as to what a fair level of fees should 
be.”  
Finally, ACM 7 made a comment on the cost of MAFR and related it to the Fees Must 
Fall issue in South Africa8. According to this member, there may well be costs related 
to MAFR in respect of both audit fees and time outlay. However, the cost of not taking 
a step to improve auditor independence, such as the implementation of MAFR, could 
lead to bigger issues in future.  
ACM 7 
“… At a personal level, that is one area [monetary costs of MAFR] that 
made me very angry because there are two things we need to realise in 
the whole world in this field. There is the cost of doing something, there 
is also the cost of not doing something… We ignored the plight of 
students who cannot pay fees because it was costly to deal with it until 
the whole country was up on fire [sic]. So [this is] the price we have since 
paid for not doing it. So… [we include the monetary cost of MAFR but] 
we don’t cost morality, we don’t cost inclusiveness, we don’t cost part of 
the other benefits which could arrive [as a result of MAFR]. So I don’t 
agree with that notion [that MAFR will lead to increased costs].”  
In summary, the results of this section provide the following answer to research 
question 4: 
4. How will MAFR affect audit fees, including the practice of lowballing, and, 
ultimately, audit quality? 
The views of members were diverse. Responses ranged from believing that MAFR 
would increase the practice of lowballing to believing that lowballing does not occur in 
practice. Therefore, the overall effect that MAFR could have on audit fees was not 
                                            
8 Fees Must Fall is a national movement in South Africa aimed towards the lowering of tuition fees for 
students (Pillay, 2016).  
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conclusive. Further research could be conducted into the affect that mandatory 
rotations of audit firms has on the audit fee charged by the firm. 
5.5. MARKET CONCENTRATION AND TRANSFORMATION 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR MAFR IN SOUTH AFRICA  
High levels of market concentration and the slow rate of transformation in the audit 
industry were concerns raised by the IRBA (2016) in its consultation paper. The IRBA 
(2016) did, however, state that the primary intention behind MAFR is to promote 
independence. Yet, the IRBA does believe that MAFR will provide opportunities for 
more firms to compete for clients through the process of audit tendering, if they are 
competent to do so, as a result of MAFR (IRBA, 2016). This practice will contribute 
towards transformation and a more competitive audit market (IRBA, 2016).  
Regarding this notion, some of the members interviewed believed that addressing 
market concentration and transformation are the true motives behind the IRBA’s 
implementation of MAFR and not the promotion of independence. These members felt 
that, if this is the true motive behind MAFR in South Africa, the IRBA should not mask 
the reason for its implementation with the promotion of auditor independence. 
Furthermore, two of the members indicated that they did not see the link between 
improving audit quality and addressing market concentration, whilst another member 
expressed that he/she struggled to draw the links between MAFR and the 
improvement of auditor independence. Ultimately some of the members held the view 
that the improvement of auditor independence and audit quality were not the primary 
objectives behind the implementation of MAFR.  
ACM 8 
“I think that [the notion that MAFR will improve the market concentration 
of audit services] is valid but then the Competition Commission must 
rather look at this and deal with the competition concerns. But then… if 
that’s the issue, we mustn’t throw this over the perceived problem of 
independence. You mustn’t… [propose] independence arguments… 
[while] the real purpose is to break up concentration or to… give the black 




“I also don’t see a link between market concentration and improving audit 
quality… You know if audit quality is defined as the probability of 
detecting a breach [or misstatement and subsequently reporting it to the 
relevant parties] ... I don’t know [that improving] market concentration 
addresses that.” 
When asked about their views on how MAFR would affect the market concentration of 
audit services in South Africa, fifteen of the twenty-two members (68%) firmly believed 
that MAFR would have no impact thereon. Two of the members (9%), the same 
members who believed that auditor independence in South Africa needed 
improvement, believed that it would have an effect on market concentration by 
improving the level of competitiveness between the audit firms. Five of the members 
(23%) held mixed views in that MAFR could increase competition between audit firms 
but that the consequences of increased competition were not necessarily clear or 
beneficial.  
One of the primary arguments put forward by the members interviewed as to why 
MAFR would not affect the market concentration of audit services is that the audit 
market in South Africa is segmented. In other words, only the larger audit firms have 
the resources, competencies and capabilities needed to audit large or international 
clients and it is, therefore, unlikely that a small to medium tier firm would be appointed 
as the auditor of such clients. Ultimately, these members suggested that audit firms of 
various sizes operate in different markets and will continue to do so regardless of the 
frequency of audit tendering because of the disparity in the capabilities of larger and 
smaller audit firms.  
ACM 11 
“The mid-tier and smaller firms are servicing a completely different market 
to the big firms. The big firms no longer do little audits.  It is not cost 
efficient, it is not the best use of their resources... It is like saying “gosh 
all the cardiologists are doing all the open-heart operations, what about 
the poor GP’s? We actually need to create a situation where the GP’s 
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can sort of start doing open heart operations.” They are completely 
different markets.” 
ACM 9: 
“I definitely think it will create an opportunity for… the middle tier firms, but I 
don’t think it will last for long because I think it is going to be very clear that they 
haven’t got the competence. So, unless they [the mid-tier firms] build up the 
competence [through a joint audit] either the audit committee will see 
incompetence in second tier firms or they are going to make one big mistake 
where they get the pants sued off them, and some big company is going to lose 
a lot of money.” 
ACM 6 
“… in many of the larger audit firms where I have been involved, I think 
there are virtually none, but certainly very few small firms, or you know 
black firms, that would actually have the skills [to audit the financial 
sector clients] … I think you could virtually… write off the entire financial 
sector.” 
Expanding on the same argument, four of the members spoke about how 
international clients are unlikely to appoint non-Big Four audit firms for various 
reasons. These reasons include the global expertise of the Big Four firms, 
which most of the smaller firms do not possess, that are needed for certain 
audits, as well as the potential requirements or demands of international 
companies to be audited by a Big Four firm.  
ACM 3 
“… If you are a small South African firm and you are trying to develop 
your own training, and develop your own auditor procedures and so on, 
it has got to be more expensive. And if it is not more expensive, it is 
probably because you are doing less of it. So, I think that is raising the 
risk of the audit, or raising the cost. Or possibly both. So, I think 
economies of scale is a massive thing. When I see the stuff we get from 
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the big four audit firms, it is mostly global stuff. It is not developed in 
South Africa, it is industry specific, it is very pertinent to what we do, and 
it is drawn on the best experience in the world. So, you know – a small 
local firm just can’t compete.”  
ACM 2 
“The other challenge is what the certain markets look like, you know, for 
specific industries, whether it is because of regulatory reasons, because 
they are multinationals, because they are seeking funding in international 
bond markets… Because of those reasons… they may have a very 
limited pool of whom they could audit, or who the auditors could be. So 
if you are a South African company but you have got bonds listed in 
Switzerland and Switzerland says “well in terms of your covenants you 
have got to be audited by one of these four companies”, that is not going 
to change how you pool in small and medium sized firms into the sort of 
audit space to be able to give them the opportunity.” 
ACM 22 
“I think the other thing you’ve got to take into account is that with… South 
African companies that are more multinational but have alternative 
listings… you can’t have an international debt list, for example, and have 
a very small firm in South Africa as an auditor for those international 
listings, etcetera. You would need to go with an international firm.” 
ACM 9 raised a unique idea that MAFR could result in audit partners “hopping” 
between the Big Four audit firms when the firms are rotated. There is nothing 
in the current legislation or regulations preventing auditors from moving to a 
different firm and, after a 2-year cooling period, continuing to be the 
engagement partner on the same client. This could result in partners moving 
between the Big Four firms as they rotate between clients, so as to retain some 




“… The easiest solution to all this is partner hopping… So here, mandatory firm 
rotation isn’t going to achieve anything other than ultimately partner hopping... 
There is no limitation on a partner jumping ship. And that is what is going to 
happen. So you will have the same audit partner, just a different audit firm… 
[There is a particular partner auditing Old Mutual who is] most probably [the] 
South African expert on insurance… [if his firm is rotated off Old Mutual], they 
[the newly appointed firm for Old Mutual] will approach him and it will be exactly 
the same for all of the experts in their industry.” 
Two of the members interviewed illustrated how it would be inefficient to 
increase the number of large competing audit firms by referring to the historical 
development of audit firms. These two members pointed out that, historically, 
there has been a natural process of mergers between audit firms, as a result of 
realising economies of scale, sharing expertise and cost reduction. 
Consequently, the profession is more efficient with fewer larger firms operating 
in the large listed client space.  
ACM 20 
“I don’t think it [MAFR] really will [improve market concentration of audit 
services]. Let’s go back in history – why did the bigger firms get 
established because they were… [eight or more firms] that were 
merged... I don’t think that [the increase in the number of large audit 
firms] will happen [again]… The only way it could work… is [if] the mid-
tier firms… [merge] to create a fifth big one and then a sixth-big one?  
That’s the only way because that’s been the history of the big firms 
[merging to form bigger audit firms].”  
A unique view was held by ACM 14 in that he/she believed that there is “not 
much of a mid-tier” in terms of the audit industry in South Africa. According to 
ACM 14, as clients have grown and spread geographically, so too have the Big 
Four audit firms. As such, clients tend to be small or large, with fewer sizes in 
between. ACM 14 felt that, through MAFR, the IRBA is trying to recreate and 
promote the mid-tier audit firm space, when in reality “market forces are not 
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actually asking for that.” Therefore, in an attempt to “artificially” grow 
competition, the auditing profession will become inefficient. 
As a result of the segmented nature of the audit industry in South Africa, the 
most common comment made by the members interviewed was that MAFR will 
result in a rotation of the Big Four audit firms amongst their current clients. For 
all the listed reasons as to why clients will tend to appoint Big Four firms, the 
members believed that as soon as one Big Four firm is due to ‘rotate-off’ a 
client, another Big Four firm will be appointed. This argument supports the 
notion that MAFR will not affect the market concentration of audit services in 
South Africa nor will it promote the industry’s transformation. ACM 12 described 
the pending end-result as “a merry-go-round” between the Big Four firms. 
ACM 19 
“The need is… [in] most instances, for the listed companies [to be audited 
by the] … bigger audit firms, with the capacity and the competence to do 
the audits. Why would rotation change that? It won’t make any difference 
to competition as such.”  
ACM 17 
“The market concentration won’t change, it will just be a rotation between 
the big four, so I don’t think it makes it more competitive.” 
ACM 18 
“With the recent [audit firm] changes, I don’t know where I saw that article 
where they listed a number of listed companies that have changed 
auditors… but if you look at just that article you will see that all the new 
auditors are the big firms, I think save for one.” 
Both members who believed that MAFR would help to promote transformation 
competition in the audit industry noted that the risk of Big Four firm rotation is 
prevalent. However, these members held the view that the manner in which 
audit committees and clients currently appoint auditors is not in line with the 
goals behind transformation. According to ACM 7, MAFR should create an 
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environment in which the audit committee can be responsible and act to 
appoint, and therefore include, firms other than the Big Four and that simply 
rotating the audits between the Big four firms is “mischievous.” He/She believes 
that inclusion can be achieved through joint audits, whereby the smaller firms 
are gradually exposed to more and more interaction with the client and, in this 
way, can develop their expertise. Ultimately, if this process is followed by the 
audit committees of larger clients, the smaller firms will have the opportunity to 
development and become competitive, so that when it comes to future 
rotations, the smaller firms could be considered viable auditor options. 
ACM 21 held the same belief that MAFR will allow medium sized firms to be 
more included in audit tenders and therefore in future, more audit firms will be 
equally competing for the larger audits. However, he/she raised the issue that 
many audit committee members will most likely appoint another Big Four firm, 
thus not giving the medium or small black firms a chance. In order for MAFR to 
have an effect on transformation, ACM 21 explained that the selection of the 
new audit firm needs to be regulated to some extent.  
ACM 21  
“Now, others [other audit committee members] argue that, “no, they’re 
going to play musical chairs. There’s going to be this one [Big Four Firm] 
going out and another one coming in...” Yes, people can be naughty... 
They can be naughty and Audit Committee members… [can] say “no we 
don’t care about transformation, we will hit back at IRBA, in making sure 
that we still get PWC. Next… we’ll get [Deloitte] then get EY.” So, the 
Black firms will never come… I’ve seen it from both angles. Having been 
an Audit Committee member and having been a supplier of audit 
services, as a Black firm. There are people, Audit Committee chairs, 
CFOs, who are so adamant that they don’t want to see a Black firm 
stepping on their toes inside their company. They just believe it’s too risky 
and they are not interested to take a risk… My only concern is that IRBA 
has not legislated that requirement. Because if IRBA had legislated 
that… [for example] a minimum of 20% must be given to a disadvantaged 
firm, then… [transformation] may be achieved. Now, we have not 
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achieved [transformation] because it is still at the discretion of… [audit 
committees and CEOs].” 
On the topic of transformation, a number of members felt that the transformation 
of the Big Four firms had been discounted by the IRBA. It was felt that the Big 
Four firms had transformation agendas and had made progress in terms of 
transformation over the past few years. 
ACM 17: 
“… there’s this notion… [that] presupposes that the big firms are 
themselves not transformed... I think it’s a myth to say that only 
companies like Gobodo are the transformed companies. Why can an 
Ernst & Young or a Deloitte or KPMG not themselves be transformed? 
So this is the kind of nonsense myth that’s created… that it’s got to be 
started by a black person for it to be a transformed company...And 
that’s… patently nonsense.” 
ACM 15: 
“So if you look at the big four they probably have as many or if not more 
black partners than the smaller firms. The short cut would be, by the way, 
to transform the big firms, in which they push them into making that 
transformation a little more pressing.” 
ACM 18 
“… What we [the audit committee] normally do is each year when the 
auditors present their plans we look at their committees we ask about 
transformation and we are pleased that some of the firms, like PWC, are 
now level one [BBEEE score]. And all of them have made very good 
progress… I just think that if the big firms are embracing transformation 
in doing the right things we need to recognise that.” 
A point of concern was raised by ACM 3 in how this notion of ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
audit firms has developed. He/She pointed out that the Big Four firms tend to 
provide the best opportunities and training facilities for their trainees as a result 
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of their size, the nature of their clients, their global exposure and resources. 
ACM 3, therefore, felt that the notion of ‘black’ firms and ‘white’ firms is 
“destructive” as it could create feelings of guilt for black trainees who want to 
sign with bigger firms and feelings of obligation to work for smaller ‘black’ firms 
in order to support transformation. Thus, it could “work against the development 
of black skills.” According ACM 3, a better means of achieving transformation 
would be to move the focus away from ‘black’ and ‘white’ firms, towards small, 
domestic, international and big firms and focus on the opportunities that can be 
provided to black trainees through the various size audit firms. 
The results of this section provide the following answers to research questions 
5.1 and 5.2: 
5.1. What effect will MAFR have on the market concentration of the auditing 
environment? 
The majority of members interviewed did not believe that MAFR would help to 
decrease the level of market concentration in the audit industry. A common belief was 
that clients will appoint another Big Four audit firm when the client is required to rotate 
off its current audit firm.  
5.2. Will MAFR help to promote the transformation of the auditing profession in 
South Africa? 
Ultimately, there were mixed responses from the members interviewed as to 
whether MAFR has the potential to promote transformation of the audit industry 
in South Africa. However, all members agreed that there were structural issues 
or obstacles that would prevent this from happening. Some of the issues raised 
by members who did not believe that MAFR would contribute towards 
transformation, such as the Big Four “merry-go-round” issue, were the same 
obstacles raised by members who believed that MAFR had the potential to 
promote transformation. In summary, many members felt that the issue of 
transformation in the audit industry would best be addressed through continued 
transformation of the Big Four firms, as opposed to limiting the measurement 
of transformation to the growth and development of the ‘black’ firms.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This study explored and documented the perspectives of a sample of audit committee 
members on the potential consequences of MAFR in the South African context. In light 
of the primary objective of MAFR being the promotion of auditor independence, the 
most significant finding of this study is that the majority of members did not believe 
that MAFR would achieve this desired objective.  
Firstly, the majority of members (20 out of 22) (91%) did not believe there to be an 
issue with the current status of auditor independence in South Africa. Therefore, a 
measure, such as MAFR, would not further contribute to the promotion of auditor 
independence and, consequently, audit quality. Ultimately, most audit committee 
members believed that MAFR would be detrimental to audit quality for various 
reasons. Rotating audit firms on a frequent basis would result in a loss of client-specific 
or industry-specific knowledge, which is considered crucial for performing a high-
quality audit. Many members also pointed out that MAFR would most likely lead to an 
increase in a variety of monetary and non-monetary costs for both audit firms and audit 
committees, that could potentially decrease the appeal of a career in quality 
assurance.  
The findings of this study also highlight certain South African-specific considerations 
with regards with MAFR and the auditing industry and contribute to the South African 
MAFR debate. The issues of market concentration and transformation in the audit 
industry and MAFR’s intended impact thereon are unique considerations for MAFR in 
South Africa. One of the most important findings of this study is, therefore, that the 
majority of audit committee members do not agree that MAFR will have the IRBA’s 
desired impact on market concentration and transformation. Many members illustrated 
how market concentrate would most likely increase. There are various factors which 
deter larger clients from appointing an auditor other than a Big Four firm. These factors 
include the greater international exposure of the Big Four firms, the enhanced quality 
of audit work in complex, specialised industries, such as the banking industry, and the 
greater level of resources which the Big Four Firms can utilise.  MAFR will not change 
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this which, therefore, means that, when it comes to audit firm rotation, the larger clients 
will only have three firms from which to choose.  
Evidence from the interviews also shows that the rate of transformation in the audit 
industry is not likely to improve with MAFR. Whilst all members interviewed agreed 
that the transformation of the audit industry is important, most of them believed that 
MAFR was not the best solution for achieving a faster rate of transformation. On the 
contrary, most members believed that MAFR would negatively impact transformation. 
This opinion resulted from the IRBA’s concept of transformation as being confined to 
audit firms owned by previously disadvantaged racial groups, namely black-owned 
firms, as opposed to also considering the transformation efforts of the Big Four firms. 
Many members believed that the Big Four firms provide accounting trainees with 
exposure to larger clients, both international and local, which would, in turn, support 
the development and skills of black accounting trainees.  
This study has contributed to the literature surrounding the debate regarding the 
effectiveness of MAFR as a policy for promoting auditor independence. Given the 
conflicting results of previous studies and the lack of studies performed in a mandatory 
rotation environment, this study provides insights, from a sample of interviewees who 
specialise in the determination of auditor independence, on the potential effectiveness 
of MAFR. The results from this study could contribute to the data used by policy 
makers and regulators in determining whether MAFR would achieve its intended 
objectives.  
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although the findings above express the views of the majority of the members 
interviewed, they do not encompass the views of all the members. Strong views were 
held by a small percentage of the members, who expressed why they believed that 
MAFR was a positive step towards achieving improved transformation in the audit 
industry. As such, a limitation of this study is that the sample of 22 members does not 
seek to be a representative of the national view of audit committee members in South 
Africa. Further research could be conducted that encompasses a larger sample, which 
could, in turn, introduce diverse views.  
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Furthermore, the interviews conducted in this study were conducted prior to the KPMG 
scandal that unfolded in September 2017 in South Africa. Further research could 
explore how the views of various stakeholders, particularly audit committee members, 
may have developed or changed as a result of the incident.  
Ultimately, MAFR is a policy that has not been implemented in many jurisdictions long 
enough to obtain conclusive evidence that it is effective in improving audit quality 
through limiting auditor tenure. As the policy has become effective in the European 
Union and is to become effective in South Africa in 2023, there will be more 
opportunities for research in a mandatory rotation environment. Such research could 
further inform the perspectives and opinions of stakeholders, such as regulators and 
audit committee members, as to the effectiveness of the policy. Further comparative 
research in other jurisdictions would be useful in determining whether MAFR is a 
suitable policy for promoting auditor independence in South Africa. However, the 
uniquely South African considerations of how MAFR will impact market concentration 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS   
The interview questions are shown alongside the related theme in order to aid the 
discussion of the results. These themes are presented in Chapter Two.  
Question(s)  Theme 
1. The IRBA believes that it needs to respond to global developments 
in the promotion of auditor independence, which most notably 
includes the implementation of MAFR by the European Union. What 
is your opinion of the current status of auditor independence in 
South Africa? 
1 
2. The IRBA does not believe that the current measures to ensure 
auditor independence in South Africa are sufficient. What is your 
view on this? 
1 
3. Has your company ever had any problems with auditor 
independence? 
1 
4. Have you ever had an experience where an auditor has issued an 
audit opinion that you believe to be inappropriate? 
1 
5. Previous studies have found that long audit tenure may result in 
external auditor familiarity or complacency, thus resulting in a 
potentially biased audit report. What has been your experience in 
this regard? 
1 
6. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the combined probability 
of the auditor detecting a breach of statutory or regulatory 
requirement and reporting the breach to the appropriate party(ies). 
What impact do you think MAFR will have on audit quality? 
1, 3 
7. Respondents to the IRBA’s consultation paper believe that the costs 
of MAFR will exceed the intended benefits. What is your view on 
3, 4, 5 
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this? What unintended costs do you foresee resulting from MAFR 
for your company? 
8. Various respondents to the IRBA’s consultation paper held the view 
that auditor independence could best be enhanced through 
developing the duties of the audit committee. How do you think the 
duties of the audit committee could be enhanced or developed in 
order to improve audit quality? 
2 
9. What processes or mechanisms do you have in place to ensure 
auditor quality and do you believe they are sufficient? 
2 
10. What is keeping you with your company’s current audit firm? 2 
11. What would cause you to change audit firms? 2 
12. The IRBA believes that MAFR will promote transformation by 
creating more opportunities for small and mid-tier audit firms to 
enter certain markets, provided they are competent to do so. What 
is your view on this?  
5 
13. The IRBA believes that MAFR will address market concentration of 
audit services by creating a more competitive environment, which in 
turn will improve audit quality. Describe your thoughts on this. 
5 
14. “Lowballing” is a practice whereby a lower fee is charged initially in 
order to compete with other firms so as to win the audit tender. What 
effect do you believe MAFR will have on the practice of lowballing 
and ultimately audit quality? 
4 
 
